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Understanding and Subverting Contemporary Right-wing 
Populism: preliminary notes from a critical agrarian 
perspective 
 
Saturnino M. Borras Jr. 
 
Abstract 
There are awkward, and in some instances troubling, parallelisms, resemblances and interconnections 
between right-wing populism and the populism of agrarian movements, past and present. These are 
not random accidents. The political economy upon which such populisms emerged partly shapes the 
kind of broader politics that get constructed. The boundaries between right-wing populist currents and 
their social base in the countryside on the one hand, and the populism of agrarian movements on the 
other hand are constantly porous, blurring and malleable. This means partly that there is a slippery 
slope down which the populism of progressive agrarian movements may slide to reinforce rather than 
undermine right-wing populism. There are two urgent tasks and challenges: to avoid such a slippery 
slope, and to transform such parallelism, resemblances and interconnections into an extraordinary 
political opportunity and emancipatory force that can contribute to strategically eroding right-wing 
populism and to building a positive future. Accomplishing such twin tasks requires (re)claiming 
populism but without its authoritarian trappings, being class conscious, and eschewing romantic 
restorative tendencies among agrarian movements some of which are utopian, conservative or 
reactionary. Finally, in their political struggles within and/or against capitalism, agrarian movements 
are more effective if they take a socialist perspective that is broadly cast in terms of what it might 
mean and who could be its prime movers. Such a perspective can be grounded in simultaneous and 
interlinked political struggles for redistribution, recognition, restitution, and regeneration in a 
framework of a revolution against the entrenched centrist strategy of ‘anti-subversive petty reform 
incrementalism’ that has been promoted alongside neoliberalism. These tasks could be made to lead 
to, and could be pursued within, the construction of a class-conscious left-wing populism as counter-
current to right-wing populism. 
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1. Introduction 
This essay is an initial attempt at understanding the awkward, and on some occasions troubling, 
parallelisms, resemblances and interconnections between right-wing populism and the populism of 
agrarian movements. Here, and loosely, populism is that political act of aggregating disparate social 
class and group interests and issues into a deliberately framed singular, homogenized voice, ‘the 
people’. There is nothing inherently regressive or reactionary in populism. Two types of populism are 
the main subjects of this paper. First is right-wing populism, which is broadly referred to here as a 
regressive, conservative or reactionary type of populism that fundamentally promotes or defends 
capitalism in the name of ‘the people’. In its current manifestation, it is also xenophobic, nationalist, 
racist, or misogynistic. Second is agrarian populism, which is that political bundling of various rural-
based or rural-oriented social groups’ and class interests and issues into a homogenized category, ‘the 
people of the land’: anti-capitalist, often assumed to be rescuing agrarian communities from capitalist 
penetration for the purpose of advancing a ‘peasant way’ toward a particular kind of development. The 
provenance of the contemporary debates about agrarian (neo)populism, can be traced to the Russian 
agrarian populists that were active during the later part of the 19th century.1 There are conservative or 
reactionary agrarian populists that fundamentally promote and defend the foundations of capitalism, 
and they are generally rich farmers with distinct demands that are for the defence of individual private 
property, avoiding labour issues, or focusing on productivist and remunerative issues, and staunchly 
anti-socialist. 
 
For lack of a better term, ‘right-wing populism’ is used in this paper. A brief explanation is warranted. 
The logic of the notion of ‘populism as a matter of degree’ (see discussion in the next section) extends 
to the notion of ‘right-wing populism’, i.e. some populist currents are leaning farther towards the right 
than others, even when they are all fundamentally veering towards the right on the basis that: (i) they 
are champions of contemporary capitalism (albeit this may take a variety of form), (ii) generally anti-
socialist, (iii) have disdain for basic democratic institutions especially human rights (human  rights 
values, laws, policies, institutions and activists), (iv) tendency towards militarism, and (v) are 
xenophobic or racist, and many are misogynistic. Le Pen is rightwing, but her rightwing-ness that is 
different from Modi’s; Modi’s is a different brand from Trump’s; Duterte maybe have some left-wing 
rhetorical posturing, but his emerging political-economic policies veer towards the right (Bello [2018] 
calls him an ‘original fascist’), and so as Putin’s populist politics. Actually existing populists will not 
have a perfect fit in the term ‘right-wing populism’, but they have no better fit in other terms floated 
around either, such as ‘authoritarian populism’ or ‘populist authoritarianism’. Most of these populist 
currents have strong tendency towards authoritarianism, but again, it is a matter of degree: Putin’s 
authoritarianism may be different in degree, extent and form compared to Erdogan’s or Trump’s. 
There will always be a lot of exceptions once we deploy a defining term. And resorting to using just 
the plain term, ‘populism’ loses the distinct character of the political moment, which is partly marked 
by some kind of ‘rightwing-ness’ and ‘authoritarianism’, at least to varying degrees and tendencies 
and in varying manifestations. Finally, this term dovetails with our discussion of a potential counter-
current, namely, a reformulated ‘left-wing populism’. It will set and clarify the basis of the 
fundamental differences between what is a right-wing and left-wing populism, and why such clarity is 
important. It will help illustrate the absurdity of some casual commentaries putting USA’s Trump and 
Venezuela’s Maduro in one basket, for instance. Yet, it will also illustrate how the term ‘left-wing 
                                                 
1 As discussed elsewhere in the paper, including the part that touches on the American agrarian populism and in 
the 1981 table by Canovan, there are various forms and traditions that do not directly speak to the debates that 
are directly linked to the late 19th century Russian agrarian populism; debates that are directly speaking to 
Marxism. The populism of Lazaro Cardeanas in the 1930s in Mexico that, in turn, built on the earlier agrarian 
radicalism by Emilio Zapata, is an example that leans towards left politics. Another example is Ramon 
Magsaysay in the Philippines who, like Cardenas, championed the issue of giving land to poor peasants, albeit 
more conservative, and his program was more of a resettlement of peasants to frontier areas, or an ‘internal 
colonization’, so to speak, than a proper land reform, and was an anti-communist, and is widely believed to be 
supported by the CIA. But we will not go into an exhaustive listing of these various types of populism. The 
Russian agrarian populism as an illustration and mappping of debated concepts is sufficient for the purpose of 
this paper. 
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populism’ also suffers a similar semantic problem, e.g. Bolivia’s Morales is a left-wing populist, but, 
arguably, employs some capital accumulation strategies with features that are more to be expected 
from a right-wing regime than a left-wing regime, e.g. neoliberal (neo)extractivism (McKay and 
Colque 2016, McKay 2017). Finally, the terms ‘right-wing’ and ‘left-wing populisms’ are used here 
like ‘bookends’, i.e. ideal-types, meaning as heuristic tools. In reality, rarely will any populist current 
fit perfectly in either ideal-types. The ‘bookends’ will allow us to see a dynamic continuum rather than 
fixed categories in between, where we see populist currents and regimes consolidate features of either 
of the ideal-types and regularly borrow features from the opposite side. We will see a constantly fluid 
situation where populists straddle across various points between these bookends, constantly morphing 
into something less of an ideal-type. This is an important feature of populism today, and such concrete 
condition renders the term ‘right-wing’ or ‘left-wing’ populism imperfect and imprecise but useful. 
  
There is a significant difference in the treatment of the concept of populism in this paper from the 
treatment in the classic debates in agrarian populism (discussed elaborately further below). In this 
paper, I use the term ‘populism’ to mean the deliberate political act of aggregating disparate and even 
competing and contradictory class and group interests and demands into a relatively homogenized 
voice, i.e. ‘us, the people’, against an ‘adversarial them’ for tactical or strategic political purposes. 
This framing of the concept will allow for engaging directly with the issue of how agrarian populists 
overlap and interact with right-wing populism. It might well be that by looking at the dynamics 
between agrarian populism and right-wing populism that an unintended by-product can be realized, i.e. 
to make fresh contribution to the classic debates on agrarian populism. But that is another matter. 
 
In its attempt at homogenizing disparate, often competing interests of various classes and groups, each 
of the contemporary right-wing populists and progressive agrarian populists is marked and defined by 
internal contradictions and, at times, antagonisms (based on class relations, ideological positions, 
political calculations, among others) even while the two ideologically opposed populist groups target 
broadly similar issues and adversaries. Why and under what conditions do right-wing populist 
agitations emerge, and what is the relationship between these conditions and the emergence of 
agrarian populists? Do they co-emerge? If so, can the latter contribute to undermining the former? 
These questions are of particular interest to activists and academic researchers who seek to understand 
the role of the rural world in the rise of contemporary right-wing populism.2 Rural populations have 
provided electoral and political support to right-wing populists, among others, Trump in the United 
States, Modi in India, Thaksin in Thailand, Erdogan in Turkey, and Duterte in the Philippines.  
Scoones et al. (2018a) offer a closer, if preliminary, look at the possible connection between 
‘authoritarian populism’ and the rural world, trying to frame new ways of asking questions in order to 
understand such a relationship. This essay builds on Scoones et al. (2018a) that explores the rise of 
authoritarian populism and the rural world. Despite big claims that the world is now urban, the fact 
remains that nearly half the world’s population, that is, more than 3 billion people, is rural. Rural 
political tendencies have become swing factors in many settings and political moments, including 
electoral politics and democratization more generally.3 Where rural voters are significant, if not the 
majority, the influence of rural issues on populist discourses and agitation is significant, and vice 
versa. We see this in Modi’s slogans in India,4  or Thaksin’s rhetoric and programs in Thailand. 
Furthermore, the issues that helped condition the rise of populism in one geographic region may 
originate or can be linked to a distant place: the rise of the populous and wealthier industrial belts in 
southeast China is linked to the massive rural-to-urban migration from other places in China, the 
phenomenon of the left-behind population in the countryside, and the widening gap between and rural 
and urban worlds that forced the national government to adopt a populist program, the New Socialist 
                                                 
2 Brass (1997) offers a critical examination of the relationship between the ‘new’ right and what he clusters and 
labels as ‘new’ populism in the 1960s through the 1990s in which agrarian themes form, he argues, a common 
bond for the two. It speaks to the themes explored in the present paper, but with different categorizations of 
objects of analysis. 
3 For the latter, see Jonathan Fox’s edited volume on rural democratization with perspectives from Latin America 
and the Philippines.  
4 See Vanaik (2018). 
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Countryside.5 The rise of these Chinese industrial belts in turn is linked to the decay of many rural and 
urban communities in the US that used to host factories, many of which shut down as capital migrated 
to southeastern China, among other destinations. Thus, the populist impulses in multiple settings - 
rural China, urban/industrial China and de-industrialized, abandoned and neglected rural and urban 
communities in the US - are concretely linked. It is not surprising that despite the differences between 
them, right-wing populists worldwide are increasingly supporting or encouraging each other. This has 
prompted Edelman to raise a question that needs serious reflection: “To what extent are the world’s 
autocrats – Trump, Duterte, Erdoğan, Modi, Orbán, Putin, among others – simply a mutually 
reinforcing collection of erratic rulers? Or are they taking shape as a global authoritarian populist 
axis?” (Edelman 2018: 1, emphasis added). And all these have resurrected the issue of agrarian 
populism in broad new ways, requiring us to revisit and critically examine it against varying 
contemporary populisms, especially right-wing populism. 
 
In this paper, we will engage with agrarian movement, but it is taken in a broader sense to mean that it 
is in itself a food sovereignty movement. The latter tends to be broader than conventional agrarian 
movement in terms of social base and agenda. Moreover, food sovereignty is understood here in three 
ways: as a critique of the global food system and its role in capitalism, as a notion of an alternative 
within and/or to capitalism, and as a movement that aggregates multiple and complementary critiques 
and constructs alternatives. While food sovereignty is not strictly an agrarian critique, alternative, and 
movement, there are elements in its provenance, social base and political inspiration that are 
fundamentally agrarian. Relevant conceptual background discussions to this particular take on food 
sovereignty include Shattuck et al. (2015), Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2015), Edelman et al. (2014), and 
Wittman et al. (2010). 
 
The awkward parallelism, resemblances and interconnections between right-wing populism and 
agrarian movements are not random accidents. The political economy upon which such populisms 
emerged partly shapes the kind of broader politics that get constructed. The boundaries between right-
wing populist currents and their social base in the countryside on the one hand, and the populism of 
agrarian movements are constantly porous, blurring and malleable. This means partly that there is a 
slippery slope for the populism of progressive agrarian movements to reinforce rather than undermine 
right-wing populism. The challenge is how to reclaim populism without its authoritarian trappings on 
the one hand, or its romantic restorative tendencies on the other hand. A notion of ‘class-conscious 
left-wing populism’ – that is anti-capitalist and socialist in perspective – in which agrarian movements 
play an important role, is put forward as a possible contribution to the struggle against the 
contemporary global right-wing populist upsurge and to building positive alternatives. In this context, 
it is critical to take up the (unexpected) proposition put forward by a leading skeptic of contemporary 
agrarian movements and food sovereignty, Henry Bernstein, to go ‘beyond the comfort zone of class 
purism’ and not to dismiss today’s agrarian populism. Revisiting the Russian revolution, Bernstein 
(2018: 21-22, original emphasis) noted the challenge for adherents of Marxist political economy 
whose strength is in socioeconomic analysis to have a better grasp of agrarian politics. He said: 
 
The route from the former to the latter entails many additional determinations and complexities, 
as well as capacity to confront the contingent, the indeterminate and unanticipated, and to 
change positions, that goes far beyond the comfort zone of class purism and other illusions […] 
This points towards a paradox… namely that while the best of Marxism retains its analytical 
superiority in addressing the class dynamics of agrarian change, for a variety of reasons agrarian 
populism appears a more vital ideological and political force. In my view, the challenges facing 
any Marxist agrarian politics would be helped by critical engagement with the most progressive 
(anti-capitalist) of today’s agrarian populism, and the diverse rural struggles it embraces, rather 
than dismissing a priori all agrarian populism as necessarily and equally ‘wrong’ and 
‘reactionary’.  
 
                                                 
5 See Ye, et al. (2013). 
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The rest of this essay consists of initial notes of uneven length on the possible links between right-
wing populism and agrarian populism, why these are critical to investigate and understand further, and 
some of the ways we can further research these questions. More generally, the aim is to better 
understand the links between right-wing populism and the rural world because while there are good 
indications that the contemporary right-wing upsurge has substantial support from the countryside, 
current efforts at understanding and fighting right-wing populism tend to be less pursued compared to 
urban-centric and big national politics oriented discussions. In a way, the effort in this paper, and that 
in Scoones et al. (2018a), resonates with the earlier argument by Paxton to study the 1920s and 1930s 
French countryside in an attempt to understand fascism in France. Paxton (1997: 6) lamented: “[I]t 
was in the countryside that both Mussolini and Hitler won their first mass following, and it was angry 
farmers who provided their first mass constituency. Yet, so far, every student of fascism in France has 
ignored the countryside.” He concluded: “Given the salience of angry farmers in the success of 
fascism elsewhere and the importance of the peasantry in the French society, that is a crippling 
omission.” We do not want to commit the same omission in the current global context. Despite the 
much lower proportion of farmers in so-called developed societies, and even in so-called developing 
societies, their absolute numbers and often their political weight remain significant. Vanaik (2018:1) 
makes a compelling appeal on why studying the rural and mobilizing at the rural front are strategic. In 
light of the rise of the Sangh in India, with its ideology of Hindutva or Hindu nationalism (with its 
hatred of Muslims and Islam) Vanaik believes that subverting communalism requires struggling at all 
fronts: cultural, political, ideological and economic, concluding that: “it is the economic front, 
especially in the agrarian sector, which is currently the Sangh’s weak spot” (ibid. emphasis added). 
 
2. Preliminary notes and starting points 
On ‘populism’ 
The concept of ‘populism’ is highly contested. In this essay, populism is treated primarily as a political 
action by particular social groups that unites otherwise disparate social class and group interests and 
demands in a relatively coherent voice or force, that is, ‘the people’6 — against a constructed ‘other’, 
often ‘the elite’. What we are keen to examine, following Rancière (2016: 102), are the “diverse or 
even antagonistic figures of the people, figures constructed by privileging modes of assembling certain 
distinctive traits, certain capacities or incapacities: an ethnic people defined by the community of land 
or blood; [...] an ignorant people that the oligarchs keep at a distance.” Rancière elaborates that the 
“notion of populism itself constructs a people characterized by the formidable alloy of a capacity – the 
brute force of great number – and an incapacity – the ignorance attributed to that same great number.” 
It connects with Laclau’s unit of analysis which is “not to be the group, as a referent, but the socio-
political demand” (Laclau 2005a: 224) of particular groups (which is understood in this paper as social 
classes and groups). It is in this political process that a section of the community/people gets projected 
as ‘the people’, and the people is reduced to mean that particular section (ibid: 214). Thus, Trump’s 
mass base is invoked by Trump as ‘the American people’, and the American people is reduced to 
pertain to that particular mass base of Trump. 
 
With these basic concepts as reference points, there are eight fundamental assumptions about populism 
discussed (with uneven length) in this essay, namely, (i) a matter of degree, (ii) ‘politics of 
appearances’, (iii) a matter of variation, (iv) oscillating between rhetoric and reality, (v) differentiated 
and layered in its composition, (vi) politically volatile and capricious (vii) transcending ideology, or 
claiming to, and (viii) relevant either way: in or out of state power.  
 
First, populism is not an ‘either/or’ question; rather, it is a matter of degree. It is better understood not 
in black and white, but in shades of grey, as we compare, for instance, the varying strands and degrees 
of populism, and tendencies towards militarism, authoritarianism or democratization of Zimbabwe’s 
Mugabe, Thailand’s Thaksin, Philippines’ Duterte, Cambodia’s Hun Sen, Myanmar’s Aung San Suu 
Kyi, India’s Modi, USA’s Trump, France’s Le Pen, Turkey’s Erdogan, Russia’s Putin, Venezuela’s 
                                                 
6 The term ‘people’ alone merits an entire essay, as it has become far more contested in the contemporary era 
marked by populist upsurge. For a useful overview, see Badiou (2016) and Canovan (2005). 
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Chávez, Bolivia’s Morales, Ecuador’s Correa, or Brazil’s Lula. As Laclau (2005a: 45, original 
emphasis) puts it: “To ask oneself if a movement is or is not populist, is actually, to start with a wrong 
question. The question that we should, instead, ask ourselves, is the following: to what extent is a 
movement populist?” This is based on the assumption that all types of politics take on some kind of 
homogenizing task in order to amplify a unified voice of the represented. The logic of this argument is 
derived from some of the key tasks of political actions to homogenize diverse interests 
(complementary, competing, or contradictory) of social groups and their political positions into a 
singular stand or voice, aimed at achieving greater salience partly by blurring if not erasing the sharp 
contradictions and differences between social groups and classes, highlighting only few unified 
features that are usually deliberately distorted if not largely imagined. Often invoked is a 
homogeneous ‘people’, which is further distilled into the populist leader’s name as the short-cut icon, 
e.g. ‘Trump’ (against the ‘Washington swamp’). The construction of a ‘populist’ project, whether 
rhetorical or real, is messy and uneven across time and space.  
 
Second, to a large extent, populism is about ‘politics of appearances’. Right-wing populist agitation 
builds on a ‘spectacle’ to generate ‘political investors’ on the strength of a promise for rewards or 
benefits. What is being suggested here is that right-wing populist agitation has parallelism with Anna 
Tsing’s notion of ‘economy of appearances’, i.e. “the self-conscious making of a spectacle [that] is a 
necessary aid to gathering investment funds […] It is a regular feature of the search for financial 
capital” (Tsing 2000: 118). She elaborates: “In speculative enterprises, profit must be imagined before 
it can be extracted; the possibility of economic performance must be conjured like a spirit to draw an 
audience of potential investors. The more spectacular the conjuring, the more possible an investment 
frenzy” (ibid.). Tsing (2000: 141-42) advances the notion of ‘spectacular accumulation’ which “occurs 
when investors speculate on a product that may or may not exist. Investors are looking for the 
appearance of success. They cannot afford to find out if the product is solid; by then their chances for 
profit will be gone […]” (ibid.). She concludes that, “real estate development requires an assessment 
of desirability and growth, not demonstrated occupancy; it sells investors attractiveness” (ibid.). 
 
In a lot of ways, right-wing populist agitation has a similar logic and operates in a similar fashion as 
Tsing’s ‘economy of appearances’. Perhaps one huge difference is that the conjuring, spectacle and 
frenzy are even greater in the current right-wing populist agitation as compared to the local Indonesian 
gold rush Tsing was studying. We can call the right-wing populist political version of Tsing’s 
‘economy of appearances’ the politics of appearances. Building on Tsing (2000: 118), we can say that 
‘politics of appearances’ is the self-conscious making of a spectacle that is a necessary mechanism in 
gathering political support. The possibility of political performance must be conjured like a spirit to 
draw an audience of potential voters, supporters and investors. The more spectacular the conjuring, the 
more possible a frenzy of political support. All right-wing populist agitations engage in spectacles, 
while their core group, supporters and sympathizers are investing political support because of their 
speculation for rewards or benefits in the form of social reforms  or for rent-seeking opportunities. 
Overall, with the spectacle and fenzy, one can feel that big things are being said and claimed, but a 
closer inspection of the concrete situation reveals that there is a huge gap between what is being 
conjured or promised and what is delivered.7 The notion of ‘politics of appearances’ can very well 
apply to the politics of agrarian movement building, agitation and mobilization. This will not, 
however, be elaborated in this present paper. 
 
Third, there are varied types of populism in relationship to democracy and authoritarianism. There are 
right-wing and left-wing authoritarian populisms, and in between them lies a diversity of possible 
combinations. Authoritarianism, seen as a dynamic political process, is inherently uneven and replete 
with contradictions, and it is hardly the case that a regime is ever completely democratic or totally 
                                                 
7 Others use the term ‘fantasy’ to advance a related argument. Examining the war on drugs by Duterte that has 
claimed close to 15,000 lives of mostly poor Filipino people, Curato (2017: 17, emphasis original) explains that, 
“it has gained traction locally for it offers a compelling fantasy: a vision of national development where fighting 
criminality is a prerequisite for prosperity.” It is a ‘fantasy’ in the sense that killing drug dealers and users will 
not fundamentally address the economic marginalization that ultimately causes addiction and dealing.  
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authoritarian. Populist currents malign the institutional establishment with pejorative labels such as 
‘corrupt politicians’ and ‘establishment insiders’ for very tactical reasons and in very tactical 
moments. They eschew or try to subvert conventional institutional links with the represented people 
and the institutionalized rules that govern interaction between representatives and the represented – at 
least selectively and tactically. On the flipside, populist projects are not always and necessarily averse 
to or incompatible with liberal democracy. Furthermore, it is not only that it is multiple, populisms of 
competing variants do co-exist and clash head-on at the same time in the same political-administrative 
territory: Trump versus Sanders in the US in 2016, and Le Pen versus Melenchon in France in 2017 
are examples.  
 
It is within this wide-ranging terrain, and following Scoones et al. (2018a) that we can examine more 
closely notions like ‘authoritarian populism’ (Hall 1985). Given the variation, some kind of typology 
is useful. The most referred to typology is the one by Canovan in 1981.8 The purpose of presenting 
table 1 here is limited to show a range of populisms (with different bases of categorizing populisms 
compared to the one done by Terence J. Byres on agrarian populism that is discussed further below), 
especially the two broad clusters of ‘agrarian populism’ and ‘political populism’. 
 
Table 1. Canovan’s typology of populism 
Agrarian populisms 
1 Farmers’ radicalism (eg the US People’s Party) 
2 Peasant movements (eg The Eastern European Green Rising) 
3 Intellectual agrarian socialism (eg the narodniki) 
Political populisms 
4 Populist dictatorship (eg Peron) 
5 Populist democracy (ie calls for referendums and ‘participation’ 
6 Reactionary populisms (eg George Wallace and his followers) 
7 Politicians populism (i.e. broad non-ideological coalition-building that draws on the 
unificatory appeal of ‘the people’ 
 
Fourth, populism inherently oscillates between rhetoric and reality, that is, ‘populism in word’ and 
‘populism in deed’. Many of the neo-extractivist left-wing regimes in the Latin American ‘pink tide’ 
governments veered towards ‘populism in deed’, at least partially. One of the defining features of 
these regimes is to continue to expand the extractivist character of neoliberal capitalism but they have 
introduced, to varying extent, redistributive social reforms, including cash transfer schemes and food 
distribution programs carried out by the ‘pink tide’ governments under Lula and Dilma in Brazil, 
Morales in Bolivia, and Correa in Ecuador – at times under creative populist banners such as ‘buen 
vivir’, or indeed, ‘food sovereignty’ (see Arsel et al. 2016, Gudynas 2011, Veltmeyer and Petras 2014, 
Vergara-Camus and Kay 2017). For instance, under Chávez, Venezuela made significant gains on 
many social policy fronts including eradicating hunger prior to the 2014 collapse of oil prices. The 
populism of Mugabe resulted in real although partial land redistribution. How sturdy and internally 
consistent is the structural and institutional legacy of such left-wing populisms when and where they 
were carried out, at least partially, is an empirical question that needs careful investigation. This is 
especially because we see competing interpretations of the current situation of Venezuela’s food 
distribution program, Zimbabwe’s land reform, or indeed what is going to happen with the left-wing 
populist gains in light of the right-wing political maneuovres that ousted Brazil’s Workers Party (PT) 
from power?9 Meanwhile, there are several right-wing populist groups that got into power on the 
promise of populist sweeping social reforms. However, there remains a huge gap between what was 
promised and what is delivered. Whether this will remain so is something to closely watch. 
 
                                                 
8 As cited in Laclau (2005b: 4). 
9 For a recent collection on Latin America’s ‘pink tide’ governments from an agrarian perspective, see the special 
issue of Journal of Agrarian Change in 2017, edited by Leandro Vergara-Camus and Cristobal Kay. For 
Venezuela’s food politics, see Schiavoni (2017). For Zimbabwe’s land reform, Moyo (2011), Scoones et al. 
(2010). 
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Fifth, a populist current (right-wing populists or progressive agrarian movements) is inherently 
internally differentiated and layered in terms of actors and political tendencies. It is useful to see 
populist groups as something internally differentiated and layered: leaders, a core group, and a social 
base of supporters and sympathizers. Each set of actors has varying agendas, roles and commitment to 
the framing of the populist agenda and agitation, not necessarily unified, with each one trying to use 
the other. A core group is usually a mixture of strange sub-groups: ideologues committed to particular 
worldviews, oligarchs, various racists, and sub-layers of brokers, speculators, scammers, swindlers, 
and perhaps even circles of organized crime. The ordinary people’s willingness to let populist leaders 
claim them, act in their name, speak on their behalf, and bundle them together as ‘the people’ (often 
rebundled in an even narrower manner as in just the name of the populist leader) is probably less about 
their belief in and commitment to the populist rhetoric or trust in the populist leader. It may mean only 
their distrust in the old establishment or traditional elitist system is so deep that they are quite relaxed 
in gambling on something unconventional.10 Moreover, a core group, or sub-groups within a core 
group do not emerge from nowhere. One reason for, and at the same time a by-product of, right-wing 
populist agitation is almost always the revival of moribund, or the expansion and mainstreaming of, 
fringe groups engaged in hate politics, such as white supremacists and other racist groups, and 
religious extremism whether of Islamic (Hadiz 2016), Hindu (Vanaik 2017), Christian, or Buddhist 
variants. 
 
Sixth, each layer of actors within a populist group (leader, core group, sympathizers or supporters) is 
politically volatile and capricious in an ever-fluid situation, where the leadership, core group, and 
mass base may behave differently over time, often in self-contradictory manner. They can change their 
discourse all the time, as they are quite situational and tactical but at the same time strategic in their 
political calculation. Duterte in the Philippines is an example: engaging in left-wing rhetoric one day, 
then into right-wing the next two days, in anti-American slogans one day, then into cooperating with 
the American troops the next week, in power sharing with the communists one day, then into 
annihilating the communists the next day; although there are more or less strategically consistent 
themes like disdain for drug addicts (especially from among the poorer classes of society) and human 
rights, sexism, and deference to China.   
 
Seventh, populist politics transcends ideology, or claims to transcend ideology. 11  Right-wing 
populism principally anchors itself in the promotion or defence of capitalism that puts the market at 
the center of everything, giving corporations the freedom to accumulate as much profit as they can 
without any serious regard to social equity and ecological balance and sustainability.12 Right-wing 
populists do not always have neat, textbook features of rightwing-ness, as they straddle various types 
and features of populism. Nevertheless, one common feature among right-wing populists is to veer 
towards authoritarianism, as their way of reaffirming and reinforcing the fundamentals of capitalism. 
Moreover, to varying degrees and between rhetoric and reality, right-wing populists internalize and 
take action on fundamental issues confronting ordinary people (working class and the middle class) 
even while they principally protect and protect big corporate interests. Contemporary right-wing 
                                                 
10 In a way this is like the reverse of the ‘moral economy of the peasant’ (Scott 1976) where peasants are averse 
to radical and risky political change and are into ‘safety first’ mode. Meaning, the pre-existing patron-client 
relations may not be the best setup for them but their subsistence rights are secured in that relationship. And for 
as long as the other options are less certain they would be better than what they have now, they wil be averse to 
challenging existing political order. In the current context, what the people have now (or the immediate past 
establishment) is so bad that people developed extreme ‘aversion to business as usual’ and are ready to take the 
risk of throwing support to something new, perhaps calculating that nothing could be worse than what they have 
now. 
11 Contemporary left-wing populism will not be discussed in this essay in any significant extent because it 
deserves deeper and more systematic stand-alone treatment, something that cannot be explored with justice in 
this short essay. Of particular interest related to the current essay is the Latin America’s ‘pink tide’ and its recent 
and present fate and possible future. See Vergara-Camus and Kay (2017) for a relevant and excellent overview.  
12 This is not to say that there are no right-wing populist strands that are anti-capitalist but at the same time are 
into ‘national socialism’. The revival of some neo-Nazi groups in Europe is relatively significant. But in general, 
the contemporary right-wing populists are not in this particular type. 
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populists — Le Pen, Trump, Modi, Duterte, Wilders, Danish People’s Party, among others — 
demonstrate this clearly. Notable for instance are working class issues that made their way on to the 
electoral platforms of right-wing populist leaders. In a provocative (and perhaps contentious analysis 
or political stand) James Petras (2018: 1) noted, “Le Pen addresses the fundamental interests of the 
vast majority of French workers, farmers, public employees, unemployed and underemployed youth 
and older workers approaching retirement.” Yet, it is important to look into the fundamental character 
of a populist current. Duterte’s economic policies, for example, despite populist agitations and 
rhetoric, are fundamentally in defending and promoting capitalism. 
 
Eighth, a populist group is relevant either way: in or out of state power. The right-wing agitation that 
we are interested in is either in or out of state power. Regardless, their significance stands. Marine Le 
Pen’s politics is just as important to be taken seriously as Trump’s despite the former being out of state 
power, while the latter is in state power. Their location vis-à-vis state power has influence on most of 
the several assumptions we discussed above, e.g. how they frame their discourse, forge alliances, and 
so on. Right-wing populist groups that are outside state power, such as the contemporary Islamic right-
wing populist agitation in Indonesia, should not be dismissed or taken for granted because they can 
actually significantly influence the character and trajectory of state power. The emergence of the 
parties similar to Wilders’ and the like in Europe, even if the centre, conservative or liberal parties 
promise never to include them in a coalition, has forced the latter parties to adopt some of the right-
wing populists’s rhetoric and policies, to catch votes. Some groups long considered to be fringe 
groupings and politically irrelevant and unpopular could, in a sudden change in political conjuncture, 
reinsert themselves into a more significant and broader right-wing populist current, such as the white 
supremacists and alt-right in the United States.  
 
Right-wing populism seen from ‘inside-outside the state’ perspective is better seen as a continuum, 
and from a long historical perspective. History here is not to be mistakenly seen as the study of the 
past. Bloch offers a critical guide: “Misunderstanding of the present is the inevitable consequence of 
ignorance of the past. But a man may wear himself out just as fruitlessly in seeking to understand the 
past, if he is totally ignorant of the present” (Bloch 1954: 36). Indeed, understanding Trump’s right-
wing populism and the progressive populism of La Via Campesina and its US affiliates requires us to 
understand the long history and moments and instances in different historical conditions of American 
populist agitations.13  If we take an ahistorical a look of the snapshot of the current hunger and 
malnutrition in Venezuela, we would be quick to blame the left-wing populism of Chavismo, 
exacerbated by the present leadership of Maduro. But such an analysis leaves out key nodes in history 
of how Venezuela got to this point, including the fact that between 1999 and 2013, the United Nations 
and FAO – and many left-wing intellectuals worldwide who now distance themselves from Chavismo 
– were full of praises and celebration of the stunning accomplishment of the Bolivarian revolution in 
eliminating hunger and malnutrition, a big accomplishment thinking that just a decade earlier, in 1989, 
people engaged in bloody food riots where dozens were killed and hundreds wounded in what is 
                                                 
13 Notable moments include 1877, with the founding of the Texas Alliance (and similar others in Illinois, the 
Dakotas, Minnesota and Kansas) that evolved into the populist Farmers’ Alliance, culminating in the so-called 
Omaha Platform in 1892 (Taggart 2000: 32-33, Hobsbawm, 1987: 36). The Omaha Platform “called for land as 
the source of wealth and the heritage of the people, to be free of speculation and of foreign investment and 
demanded all land owned by railroads and other corporations ‘in excess of their actual needs’ should revert to 
the government and be held for settlers” (Taggart 2000: 34). To a large part, it reads like a manifesto by La Via 
Campesina – except for the explicit framing of the settlers as ‘the people’ (and the people has been reduced to 
mean the settlers), which means legitimizing the dispossession of indigenous peoples whether in the United 
States, Canada or the rest of the world. Between 1892 and today, there has been a long, dynamic history of 
American populist agitation of various types, including George Wallace’s right-wing populism in the middle of 
the 1960s civil rights movement. Chrisman (2016) rightly goes as far back as the Reagan era in explaining the 
2016 rural American votes, but we see it could be stretched farther back in history. Or, indeed, any attempt at 
having a fuller understanding of the current coal mining issues and Trump support in and on the outskirts of the 
Appalachia can only be successful by understanding the past to include the anatomy of power and powerlessness 
in this region of the United States, as examined by John Gaventa in his 1982 classic book (Gaventa 1982). 
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popularly referred to as ‘Caracazo’. If we follow Bloch’s historical method in our analysis, then we 
will be able to locate more appropriately the roles of left-wing populist policies and the current right-
wing opposition (and their lineages) across political moments, at the very least from the 1989 
Caracazo to the 2018 deep food and social crisis – as well as the role of agriculture and countryside 
(Lander and Fierro 1996, Lander 2014, Schiavoni 2017). The key point here is that a messy, recursive 
reading of the present and the past in order to plan for future political actions is key in understanding 
and confronting contemporary right-wing populism and building a positive future, and in 
understanding the possible role of the rural world in that process. 
 
On agrarian populism 
In critical agrarian studies, populism has a broadly similar meaning as discussed so far. The immediate 
provenance of contemporary agrarian populism is the left-wing Russian narodniks during the second 
half of the 19th century that aimed to overthrow tsarist rule and to rescue the surviving Russian peasant 
communes (obshchina) and their organizational structure (mir) that they believe can constitute the 
seed for a possible socialist future. Narodnism (‘narod’ broadly means ‘people’) was a ‘restorative 
struggle’ with a tendency to romanticize communities where capitalist relations have not fully taken 
over yet. Thus, the peasantry was seen as the route to socialism without having to pass through the 
capitalist phase of development. One of the key inspirations for the narodniks was Alexander Herzen, 
who was disillusioned by the lack of a revolution in 1848, left Russia and lived in London. The main 
ideological themes he developed for Russia included: distrust of liberal democracy, suspicion of 
abstractions, faith in the Russian peasant, and belief in the need for a dedicated group of 
revolutionaries (Taggart 2000: 49). For the intellectuals, the practical usefulness of the organization of 
the obshchina (i.e. mir) was a major attraction. But they also believed that the Russian peasantry 
remained “uncorrupted by modern capitalist and Western development… The purity of the peasantry 
was a reflection of their ‘innocence’ and their untaintedness” (ibid. 50). This perspective would stand 
in direct opposition to the Leninist interpretation of Marx, where Lenin saw a socially differentiating 
Russian peasantry amidst capitalist penetration of the countryside, and the development of the 
productive forces as necessary stages towards capitalism and socialism, thereby viewing capitalism in 
both its destructive and creative sides (Lenin 2004 [original 1905]).  
 
It was estimated that about 2,000 to 3,000 urban intellectuals went to the Russian countryside in 1874, 
with a certain degree of spontaneity, without any written program or organization. These young 
intellectuals did not know much about peasant life and the practicality of political work. “Moving 
from village to village, they distributed revolutionary pamphlets and talked indiscriminately to the 
peasants who crossed their path about the need to radically redistribute land and engage in revolution” 
(Taggart 2000: 50). The narodniks would soon be frustrated by what they would discover about 
peasants’ politics: the peasantry did not have the appetite for revolution. The urban intellectuals 
imagined and expected peasants “to be oppressed, idealistic and ripe for revolution. In practice they 
found the peasants to be acquisitive, conservative and profoundly suspicious of the students” (ibid.: 
52). Perhaps even more troubling for the narodniks was their realization of how deep the loyalty of the 
Russian peasants was towards the tsar. Many of these peasants would tip the authorities about the 
presence of the narodniks. By 1877, most of the students, about 1,611, had been arrested. Taggart 
(2000: 52) made a powerful summary of the 1874 event: “The summer of 1874 showed what a group 
of activists could do. More than that, it showed what the peasantry would not do” (ibid.). The 
narodniks shifted strategy from educating the peasantry to engaging in armed struggle, mainly 
assassination attempts at the tsarist authorities, especially the tsar, some successful, mostly not. Two 
waves of organizational grouping came about, ‘Land and Freedom’ (Zemlya i Volya) and the ‘People’s 
Will’ (Narodnaya Volya), the latter succesfully assassinated the tsar (Alexander II, in 1881). But 
quickly afterwards, amid arrests, convictions and executions, the People’s Will was broken (Taggart 
2000: 54).  
 
The intellectuals in the People’s Will got into direct contact with Marx, and they read Capital and 
adhered to most of its basic tenets. Zasulich wrote to Marx: “[W]e often hear it said that the rural 
commune is an archaic form condemned to perish by history, scientific socialism and, in short, 
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everything above debate. Those who preach such a view call themselves your disciples par excellence: 
‘Marksists’.” She continued: “Their strongest argument is often: ‘Marx said so.’ You would be doing 
us a very great favour if you were to set forth Your ideas on the possible fate of our rural commune, 
and on the theory that it is historically necessary for every country in the world to pass through all the 
phases of capitalist production” (Zasulich 1983: 98-99 [original 16 February 1881], original 
emphasis). To which Marx responded, after several lengthy draft versions of his reply: “The analysis 
in Capital… provides no reasons either for or against the vitality of the Russian commune. But the 
special study I have made of it, including a search for original source material, has convinced me that 
the commune is the fulcrum for social regeneration in Russia” (Marx 1983: 124 [original 8 March 
1881]). The exchange between Zasulich and Marx was the subject of much controversy and debate in 
the literature of Marxist agrarian studies.  
 
Teodor Shanin put together these documents and assembled reflection papers based on these (Shanin 
1983a). Going through the various drafts of Marx’s reply to Zasulich, Shanin (1983b) summarized 
some of what he thought were among the most significant elements in Marx’s drafts, concluding that: 
“To Marx…  a timely revolutionary victory could turn the Russian commune into a major ‘vehicle of 
social regeneration.’ A ‘direct starting point of the system to which the contemporary society strives’ 
and a grass root framework for large-scale co-operative labour and the use of ‘modern machinery’” 
and added: “[T]o understand it all ‘one must descend from pure theory to Russian reality’.” 
 
While the original Russian populism was short-lived, its legacy and influence would continue on, 
partly because of the key elements it brought forward, namely, its principal commitment to socialism, 
albeit trying to take the route via the peasantry. As Hobsbawm (1977: 199, cited in Bernstein 2018: 5-
6) puts it, narodnism “is not significant for what it achieved, which was hardly anything, nor for the 
numbers it mobilised, which hardly exceeded a few thousand...[but that it]... formed, as it were, the 
chemical laboratory in which all the major revolutionary ideas   of the nineteenth century were tested, 
combined and developed into those of the   twentieth century.” This would make them inextracably 
linked to subsequent Russian revolutionary ideas and practice, from Leninism onwards, to 
contemporary Marxism for that matter, and to the Chayanovian socio-economic logic of the peasant 
economy.14 Narodnism, decimated after 1881, reincarnated “in the form of a ‘Social Revolutionary’ 
party in the early 1900s,” and it would “become the major rural party of the left…” (Hobsbawm 1987: 
295). For Shanin (1983c: 271): 
 
The crux of the originality and illumination of the Russian revolutionary populist lies… in the 
posing of a number of fundamental questions concerning capitalist society, its ‘peripheries’ and 
the socialist project. The attempts to disqualify those questions as belonging to the past only, i.e. 
                                                 
14 Later, around the 1920s, Alexander Chayanov would develop his theory on peasant economy, based largely on 
his reading of socioeconomic dynamics of the peasant household (Chayanov 1966 [orig. 1925]). Chayanov’s 
theories of the peasant economy would later become a key influence in subsequent agrarian (neo)populist 
discourse and among towering agrarian scholars such as Teodor Shanin, James C. Scott and Jan Douwe van der 
Ploeg (see, Shanin 1972, Scott 1976, van der Ploeg 2013). The competing interpretations of the Russian 
peasantry offered by Lenin and Chayanov (and later, and more fundamentally between the Stalinist and 
Chayanovian views on agriculture) would frame subsequent debates on the agrarian question historically 
worldwide. Among the relatively recent recent treatments of the agrarian question that engage the Lenin-
Chayanov debate include: Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2010a, 2010b), Bernstein (2009), Bernstein (forthcoming), 
Moyo et al. (2013), van der Ploeg (2018) and White (2018a, 2018b). Shanin’s view is that it is fundamentally 
more the Stalinist-Chayanovian, than the Leninist-Chayanovian opposing views that were deeply problematic, as 
he argues that Lenin’s views on the peasantry was in fact evolving especially in his later years. In part he implies 
that there is likely to be some misconceptions about Lenin’s view of the peasantry and part of the problem is 
conflating Leninist and Stalinist ideas (Teodor Shanin, personally communication 25 February 2018). Moreover, 
to what extent do the original narodnism and Chayanov have informed contemporary agrarian populism is 
something that, in my view, is generally assumed or theoretically extrapolated rather than demonstated. This is 
relevant to ask especially because most of the important agrarian movements do not actually make explicit the 
theoretical provenance of their political frameworks, and the few that do make explicit their theoretical 
inspirations actually invoke Marx -- and never Herzen, Chernyshekvskii or Chayanov, as in the case of Brazil’s 
MST. 
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representing the Russian social backwardness in the 1880s or the petty bourgeoise nature of its 
peasantry, have proved wrong by historical experience. The decline of peasant Russia did not 
make those questions disappear; quite on the contrary, most of them became increasingly global 
and pertinent also in super-industrial environments. Such questions left unanswered come back 
to haunt socialists time and time again, and will proceed to do so until faced, theoretically and 
politically. They can be avoided only at socialism’s peril.  
 
Before closing the issue of Russian populism in this particular section, it is important to clarify a 
central point: how did the politically loaded term ‘populism’ originate, evolve and come to have such 
a negative meaning in the Marxist academic and political tradition? In the history of some communist 
parties, ‘(neo)populism’ or ‘(neo)populist tendency’ was viewed from a ‘revolutionary-
counterrevolutionary’ (‘R-CR’) framework that in turn could, and did, lead to factional purges, a 
position that is definitely influenced by the Stalinist interpretation of Marx and Lenin. We turn to 
Shanin once again for his interpretation of the history of this term that is so central for the purpose of 
the current paper. In the specific context of Marxism and the narodniks, he explained (Shanin 1983b: 
8) as follows, and we will see that the history of this term was intertwined with right-wing populism:  
 
The label ‘populist’, like that of ‘marxist’, is badly lacking in precision; the heterogeneity of 
both camps was considerable. In Russian speech a populist (narodnik) could have meant 
anything from a revolutionary terrorist to a philanthropic squire. What makes it worse is the fact 
that there are today no political heirs to claim and defend the heritage of Russian populism – 
political losers have few loyal kinsmen, while the victors monopolise press, cash and 
imagination. Lenin’s major work [The Development of Capitalism in Russia], from which 
generations of socialists learned their Russian terminology, used ‘populism’ as a label for a 
couple of writers who stood at that time on the extreme right wing of the populists... This made 
Lenin’s anti-populist argument of 1898 easier, while increasing the obscurity of the populist 
creed to his readers of today.  
 
Agrarian populism is plural and diverse, as the debates themselves would demonstrate. Terence J. 
Byres in his 1979 classic critique of the populism of Michael Lipton (1977) identified three types of 
agrarian populism: classical populism, neo-populism, and liberal populism (Byres 1979). He would 
later, in 2004, advance the notion of ‘neoclassical neo-populism’ to categorize the body of work of 
Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz (2002) (and Lipton). 15  Neo-populism is essentially identified with 
Chayanov (1966 [original 1925]) that is supposed to be marked by continuity and change from 
classical populism. Following Byres’s categories, it is rather easy to conclude that much of the 
contemporary agrarian movements associated with La Via Campesina do not fit the liberal and 
neoclassical neo-populist types; these types capture more the IFAP/WFO grouping, as discussed 
further below. It becomes complicated and contentious when we examine contemporary agrarian 
movements and food sovereignty movements from the lens of classical populism and neo-populism. 
Byres’s bases for each category can be found in many of the progressive agrarian movements today. 
                                                 
15 In a classic 1979 critique of Lipton, Byres argued that Lipton embraces classical populism in as much as he 
has “an almost mystical faith in the mass of the people (who happen to be rural-‘countryfolk’) – not some of the 
people, but all of them who are capable… of uniting against their urban oppressors and establishing egalitarian 
Utopia” (Byres 1979: 238, original emphasis). He continued to elaborate that Lipton is a classical populist 
because of his belief that “the small farmer is more efficient…  than the large… a distaste for industry and a 
conviction that industrialisation… is undesirable; an anti-capitalist stance; a determination to confront and reject 
Marxism, allied to a curious fascination with Marxist ideas…” Byres argued that Lipton is a neo-populist 
because of his “defence… of rich peasants… in his claim that he actually accepts the need for industrialisation, 
but in the distant future, and not if an efficient agriculture is possible; and in his aversion to revolution.” Byres 
(2004) tagged Chayanov (1966 [original 1925]) as the father of neo-populism. Finally, Byres argued that Lipton 
is a liberal populist because of his “aversion to revolution” and “with its accompanying professed faith in 
reformist solutions and in the power of reason and argument to secure social justice (even from dictators)” 
(ibid.). Twenty-five years later, Byres (2004) criticized the work of Griffin, Khan and Ickowitz or ‘GKI’ (2002) 
on land reform, implicating Lipton, and put forward an argument that GKI and Lipton are in fact ‘neo-classical 
neo-populist,’ with their fundamentals actually anchored in neoclassical economics. 
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The Leninist/Stalinist-classical/neo-populist debate remains open, in my view (see latest important 
installments: White 2018a, van der Ploeg 2018, 2013; Bernstein 2009, 2018). 
 
The reason for bringing in Byres’ categories is limited to the purpose of emphasizing the plurality and 
diversity of actually existing agrarian populisms, where even Byres’ categories of ‘classical populism’ 
and ‘neo-populism’ are each highly differentiated in reality. Bernstein’s (2018: 21 22) emphasis on not 
dismissing ‘a priori’ agrarian populists is, partly and importantly, a methodological question that 
suggests a call for concrete analysis of concrete condition. Heeding this call, and taking a closer look 
at contemporary agrarian movements, we will see highly differentiated national and transnational 
agrarian movements based on class, ideology and politics. However, there is a tendency in the debates 
to see and label them as a unified and homogeneous movement. They are not. The various social 
classes and groups that comprise this lumped-together category of ‘agrarian (neo)populism’ – and the 
movements that compete to (re)present these, separately and collectively – are linked through class 
relations, and their internal politics are, at times, marked by antagonistic relations. The breadth and 
diversity get wider and more complex as these (sub)national movements link horizontally across 
classes and national borders, and unite vertically as they forge transnational coalitions. A basic class 
analysis of these national and transnational, sectoral and multisectoral agrarian movements would 
demonstrate highly differentiated movements based on class, ideology and politics, and other 
‘identifiers’ (race, ethnicity, gender, generation) (Edelman and Borras 2016). It is therefore 
unfortunate that such movements, separately and together, are often lumped together, understood and 
labeled a priori as amorphous ‘agrarian populist movements’ – pejoratively – and are dismissed on 
these basis and as such. Sometimes it produces awkward pairing of theoretically rigorous ideas and 
shaky empirical basis. For example, there is not much debate about the fact that some Indian farmer’s 
movements are movements of rich farmers or at least led by rich farmers, and are conservative even 
when they employ noisy agitation against urban and foreign corporations in the sense that they do not 
take up the fundamental class issues and demands of the rural landless working people around land 
and labour (Assadi 1994). But this conclusion specifically on these particular Indian movements 
cannot be extended to La Via Campesina as a whole, even when these Indian movements are key 
members of the transnational movement. Some of the key movements within La Via Campesina 
represent entirely different stories. Letus illustrate this point by looking at the three of the founding 
members of La Via Campesina, namely, Brazil’s MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra) 
which is a broadly Marxist agrarian movement, Philippine Peasant Movement (KMP, Kilusang 
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas) which is within the close orbit of a Marxist-Leninist-Maoist left movement, 
and Andalucia’s SOC (Sindicato Obrero del Campo) which comes from a broad anarcho-syndicalist 
tradition. All of which have explicit socialist perspectives, and all had played key leadership roles in 
La Via Campesina at various stages of the history of this transnational movement. These three 
movements do not have a perfect fit in the Leninist (or, more appropriately, Stalinist) formulation of a 
classical agrarian populist, or any of the subsequent formulation of ‘neo-populism’; none of the three 
movements is conservative, reactionary or utopian’; none of the three is class blind in their political 
work; none of these three organizations has similarity with the Indian rich peasant movements in terms 
of class base, ideology and politics. As far as I know, based on my long, sustained political work 
among agrarian movements, I would guess that the overwhelming majority of the movements 
affiliated with La Via Campesina veer towards, to varying degrees and extents, MST, KMP or SOC in 
terms of social base, ideology and politics than to the caricature of an agrarian populist, classical or 
neo. Interpretation and presentation by observers – allies, advocates, admirers, sympathizers of 
agrarian movements, whether academic researchers or NGOs  – may not always be a precise reflection 
of what actually exists in agrarian communities or among these movements, and thus, these materials 
have to be treated always with great care. Raised from a different context, a closely relevant 
perspective is the important critical-but-sympathetic discussion by Tania Li (2014, 2015) on the 
question of indigenous peoples in a capitalist land frontier in Indonesia, and how movements or NGOs 
understood (or misunderstood) these communities, present and project them in the outside world, and 
(mis)inform their broader advocacy work. 
 
And yet there are two other notable international farmer federations, namely, the International 
Federation of Agricultural Producers (IFAP, established in 1946 and self-liquidated in 2010), and 
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arguably, its reincarnation in the form of World Farmers Organization (WFO) (Desmarais 2007, 
Edelman and Borras 2016). These organizations are the movements of rich commercial farmers, or are 
politically led or influenced by the latter, are largely based in the Global North with a few members in 
the Global South that are movements of medium-scale and rich agricultural producers and farmers, 
such as Nicaragua’s UNAG (Unión Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos). Their sets of demands are 
fundamentally different from La Via Campesina’s. Generally, they are defenders of capitalism, and 
opposed to socialism. They endorsed WTO, with minor reforms. Most of them can easily fit in Byres’ 
categories of ‘liberal populism’ and/or ‘neoclassical neo-populism’. It will be interesting and 
important to examine whether and how, and to map the extent to which, their mass base are linked to 
contemporary right-wing populism, and compare whether progressive agrarian populists behaved 
differently as compared to their conservative counterparts in interacting with or confronting right-wing 
populism. 
 
The reason for going through this lengthy explanation above is to demonstate that ‘agrarian populism’ 
is, in reality, far more differentiated than its homogenized and caricaturized depiction. Deliberately 
lumping them together or failure to discern this differentiated nature can lead to a flawed deployment 
even of objectively rigorous theoretical ideas, and can lead to unfortunate or even disastrous political 
miscalculations in terms of practical politics, or worse, to dismiss such movements altogether. Thus, a 
critical starting point in this paper is that agrarian populism is diverse in terms of class, ideology and 
politics. Conservative rich peasant movements exist, but these are not included in the broader category 
that I use in this paper, namely, ‘progressive agrarian populism/populists’, the defining character of 
which, in the minimum, is being radically anti-capitalist. We now turn to take a glance at these 
movements. 
 
Contemporary progressive agrarian movements are relatively vibrant. Their political actions are 
populist centrally because these are attempts at re-bundling socio-economically differentiated class 
and group interests and issues into a more homogenized voice: ‘people of the land’. The rise of 
transnational agrarian movements (TAMs), particularly La Via Campesina, during the past couple of 
decades, and the subsequent platform for action, that is, food sovereignty16 are perhaps the most 
significant political processes in the social justice movement global front since neoliberalism kicked in 
and debilitated conventional workers’ unions and movements in the early 1980s (Desmarais 2007, 
Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2011, Edelman and Borras 2016). La Via Campesina is, practically, a 
populist movement – based on our definition of the term (which is not necessarily pejorative). It is not 
that this brand of agrarian populism is necessarily and always class blind, as is often insinuated in 
debates. More generally, the assumption that populism and class blindness necessarily and always go 
together should be interrogated against the weight of concrete evidence. In my view, it is precisely the 
class-consciousness within some of these TAMs and food sovereignty movements (definitely La Via 
Campesina, or a large part of it at least) that has led them to aggregate disparate interests and demands 
among differentiated social classes and groups in deliberately framed multi-class political projects. It 
does not mean they were able to resolve the inherent contradictions or even antagonism in some of 
these social relationships, e.g. farmers and (migrant) farmworkers, and so on. It only means that these 
class dynamics are actually flagged, and being addressed even if unevenly within and between 
movements across societies and over time. This is a necessarily tension-filled and conflict-ridden 
process. Class-based politics is, like agrarian populism, diverse and plural. Rigid and sectarian 
interpretation of Marx (and arguably, Lenin) is one – but not the only possible type of class-based 
politics, as the contrasting approaches by Jeffrey Paige (1975) and Eric Wolf (1969) would show us, 
for instance. 
 
The specific brand of progressive agrarian populism being pointed out above is different from iconic 
populist agrarian movements led by charismatic leaders and powerful orators and agitators such as 
Henry Dorgeres of the 1920s and 1930s French ‘Greenshirts’ movements, caudillo-led movements in 
                                                 
16 Food sovereignty is broadly defined as the right of peoples to produce, distribute and consume food in and 
near their territory in safe, healthy, culturally appropriate and ecologically sustainable ways. For definitional and 
analytical survey of debates and debated concepts, see Shattuck et al. (2015) and Edelman et al. (2014). 
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the Latin American tradition, and some rich peasant movements in India from the 1980s onwards that 
were deliberately class blinding (opposing land reform, zero agenda on landless labourers, overly 
focused on productivist and remunerative issues and struggles, and so on). While reliance on 
charismatic leaders was common in agrarian populist movements, it is not necessarily always so. The 
agrarian populists in the USA (Farmers’ Alliance, People’s Party) were, according to Taggart (2000: 
30) “a true mass movement. Compared with populist movements elsewhere in history, it is clear that 
the star of populism was not tied to the charismatic personalized leadership of one particular 
individual.” Most of the current agrarian movements associated with progressive transnational 
agrarian movements (TAMs), especially La Via Campesina, at least generally speaking, have disdain 
for and actively work against conventional agrarian populism that was typical superstar-centric in their 
style of leadership and work. Many of these are true mass movements, as exemplified by multiple 
movement organizations, not just the well known Movement of Landless Workers or MST in Brazil 
(Pahnke et al. 2015, Wolford 2010). But as it happens to large mass movements, and for various 
reasons, there are some awkward and problematic alliances forged with problematic groupings, such 
as La Via Campesina and the rich peasant movements in India. 
 
The point is that contemporary agrarian populism coincided with the latest episode of right-wing 
populist agitations, and it is not a random accident they emerged more or less at the same time and 
tackle similar issues, albeit in fundamentally competing fashion. It is not an accident that Canovan’s 
1981 typology of global populisms is split between a big politics populism and agrarian populism (see 
table 1). 
 
Oppositions and the insurgent and anti-establishment nature of populism 
Populist agitation is always antagonistic to an ‘other’. The ‘us’ cannot be constructed without 
conjuring up a ‘them’. But to the extent that the ‘us’ is defined or constructed, this is always framed as 
‘the anti-status quo’, ‘the anti-establishment’, ‘the subaltern’, ‘the underdog’, ‘the wronged’, ‘the 
violated’, ‘the looked-down’, ‘the pushed aside’, ‘the left-behind’, or ‘the challenger’.17 It revolves 
around an insurgent and subversive narrative and political action, often in a belligerent manner. 
Right-wing and left-wing populists are two ideologically opposed groups targeting broadly similar 
issues and antagonists. Thus, even though each takes an adversarial and antagonistic stance against the 
other, their discourse and actions around shared elements of their anti-establishment narratives can 
actually be mutually reinforcing. Bernie Sanders’ attack against ‘the establishment’ for having caused 
the closure of American factories was cast firmly within an anti-capitalism/neoliberalism frame, while 
Trump did the same except that the blame was not on capitalism/neoliberalism but on unpatriotic 
American corporations. Sanders and Trump similarly gained popularity in the US rust belt 
communities. It is thus not surprising that the social base of an insurgent right-wing populist group can 
sometimes also be the mass base of a challenger left-wing/progressive initiative, or at least the 
boundaries between them are porous, blurring or malleable. The overlapping mass bases are usually 
those who are not part of the ideological core of the right- and left-wing populist groups, and can 
constitute the ‘swing vote’ that can be lured from left-wing issues to right-wing populism. Again, the 
American rust belt politics during the 2016 national elections is a good example where traditionally 
Democratic states voted Trump when Sanders failed to become the Democratic Party presidential 
candidate.18 Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump, for example, have ideological opposites for some of 
their core groups: ‘alt-right’ for Trump, socialists for Sanders, but they have common supporters and 
sympathizers, and the basis of the latter, at least in the beginning, is not their ideological stances, but 
the concrete issues addressed, such as factory closings amid corporate migration outside the country. 
These can be, and had been, made ideological later on. 
 
Right-wing populist groups and anti-capitalist agrarian movements are both insurgent anti-
establishment challengers, although they operate on different scales, with the former often in the 
spotlight of big politics. Transnational agrarian movements like La Via Campesina and food 
                                                 
17 See further elaboration by Panizza (2005). 
18 For elaboration and insiders’ accounts, see Sanders (2016) and Bond and Exley (2017). 
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sovereignty movements are populist movements in the sense discussed in this essay. Notably, they: (a) 
aggregate the interests of disparate social classes and groups, (b) push to homogenize discourses 
among their component groups and political currents, (c) project a common alternative future, in 
opposition to the future under what they project to be the antagonistic ‘other’. Agrarian movements 
construct the ‘us’ at the same time that they construct the ‘other’ or ‘them’: the industrial food system, 
institutionalized corporate monopolies and everything and everyone that constitute this complex of the 
elite and the powerful. They juxtapose ‘the people’ or the ‘community’ as the ‘us’, and the big 
corporations (agro-chemical corporations, food empires, banks, and so on) and landed classes as the 
‘them’. Similarly, the progressive left-wing slogan ‘the 1% versus the 99%’ is a populist but definitely 
class-conscious formulation. The way food and agrarian movements construct powerful punchy 
slogans reflects such consciousness in the constant invocation of the ‘us’ and the ‘other’: ‘industrial 
agriculture heats up the planet, small-scale agriculture cools down the earth’, ‘not about us without 
us’, ‘people before profit’, ‘no to agriculture without farmers’,  ‘small-scale farmers feed the world’, 
‘WTO kills’, ‘the massive movement of food around the world is causing the increased movement of 
people.’ Their ability to condense complex conditions of their disparate base in short, graphic slogans 
that become key reference points and mobilizing narratives is a brilliant populist strategy of 
constructing the ‘us’ and its ‘other’. 
 
Many contemporary right-wing populist groups have evolved in a very similar manner by aggregating 
disparate social classes and groups in the rural world, forging a homogenizing discourse, and 
projecting a future in ways that somewhat converge in some ways with agrarian movements and food 
sovereignty movements, even when the basis, reason and implications are fundamentally different. 
Marc Edelman has pointed this out earlier (2014:970). For him, this is illustrated by the fact that, 
“many food sovereignty enthusiasts favour abolishing or diminishing regulation of local trade and of 
preferred products (e.g., raw milk and raw milk cheeses). In this respect, their vision sometimes 
converges with that of the detested neoliberals, who tend to view all regulation as onerous for 
business, large and small.” This is concretely demonstrated by a local food sovereignty campaign in 
northeast United States: “They [Maine farmers] don’ t need inspectors to make sure they are 
following good practices’ , Tony Field and Beverly Bell declare. ‘[K]eeping their neighbors, 
families, and long-time customers in good health is an even better incentive” (Edelman 2014: 970). 
  
Crisis and past cycles of broken promises 
The feeling of extreme frustration is common to both the right-wing populist mass base and agrarian 
movements. In many settings in the world, this mounting frustration derives from problems around 
cheap food provisioning, social security and health care, jobs, neglect of public services, social decay 
including the menace of drug addiction, absence of redistributive reforms like land reform, persistent 
violence and criminality, rural-urban migration flows, and massive indebtedness,19 that separately or 
together generated so much angst and anger among people in the countryside. These issues are 
magnified during socioeconomic and political crisis. It is the crisis situation that provides the fertile 
ground for the populist seed to grow: the fact or threat of socioeconomic losses among ordinary people 
coinciding with the state’s inability or unwillingness to act according to what people perceive to be its 
moral obligation to respond in times of crisis and whose ‘fault’ it is. Crisis revives the mass feeling of 
past cycles of broken promises or a broken system. It is the simultaneous convergence of multiple 
crises (economic growth without social equity, and so on) that has triggered the current right-wing 
populist upsurge. Historically, the rise of right-wing populism was accompanied by or was a response 
to crisis. The French ‘Greenshirts’ peasant movement of the 1920s and 1930s emerged as a response 
to the triple crisis: economically (“as an ever-deepening decline of farm prices that lasted so long and 
plunged so low that even the most diligent efforts could barely keep a family alive”), culturally (“the 
low esteem for peasants life, values, and needs…”), and politically (a “crisis of representation. There 
seemed to be no leader or insitution in the French Third Republic with sufficient concern, 
comprehension, or will to devote pubic attention to the peasants’ plight.”) (Paxton 1997: 11). 
 
                                                 
19 Gerber (2014) offers a powerful analysis of the role of debt in capitalism, with reference to the rural world.  
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The contemporary converging multiple crises in and around the global food system and capitalism has 
been the general condition in which the ideas of and movements for food sovereignty emerged in the 
1990s. Capitalism’s response to its own crisis and the multiple crises it causes is to seek more 
opportunities from crisis to make more profit.  
 
In all these, past cycles of broken promises of rural reforms and reform of the global food system have 
led to the accumulation of frustration and anger among rural and urban social groups and the rise of 
vibrant transnational agrarian, climate justice and food sovereignty movements – all with strong 
populist impulses and tendencies. They are increasingly linking their movements together.20 It is not 
an accident, for example, that the 2009-2010 global food riots that involved all sorts of working people 
in both urban and rural spaces erupted (Bush and Martiniello 2017), and the anger, sentiments and 
energy that went into those riots are likely to have been transmitted to the current right-wing populist 
mass support. 
 
Yet the same manifestations of capitalism in crisis have also spurred the current right-wing populist 
agitations, although the latter frame such crises differently, as for example, the right-wing US 
populists’ climate change denial and Trump’s electoral promise to revive the dying coal industry. And 
how Trump will fundamentally differ from past administrations in terms of its treatment of American 
agriculture and the countryside remains to be seen, although it is likely that it will continue with 
similar policies. The continuing past in the US agricultural front points to this likelihood. As Chrisman 
(2016: 1), who offered a short and sharp initial analysis of why rural America voted Trump, explains 
“[a]s of 2012, just four percent of farms produced two-thirds of agricultural value—that’s a lot of 
wealth concentrated in just a few hands. Today, a small number of farmers are ‘efficiently’ producing 
more grain than ever, while metropolitan and suburban populations have ballooned.” She continues, 
“But what of those who remain? 46 million Americans still live in the countryside, with many 
hollowed out towns, few job prospects, and the near impossibility of making a living off the land for 
all but the biggest farm operators” (see also Edelman 2018, Ulrich-Schad and Duncan 2018). This is 
where food sovereignty holds the potential to radicalize the discourse, erode right-wing populist 
agitation, and advance a more promising progressive alternative. Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck (2011) 
offer useful anaytical and political reference points as to how this can happen, and how we should 
understand the highly differentiated currents of social movements calling for reforms of the food 
system, globally and in the context of the United States. The adverse impact of neoliberal 
globalization on ordinary people has been severe not just in the United States, but also globally; and its 
implications for the rise of right-wing populism are the same.  
 
Divergences in the forms of collective actions, political rule, and alternatives 
It is important not to forget that rural social classes and groups have a checkered record in terms of 
supporting right-wing, fascist political projects. The contemporary rural support for Trump in the 
United States (Ulrich-Schad and Duncan (2018), Putin in Russia (Mamonova (2016), Le Pen in 
France, Erdogan in Turkey, and Modi in India reminds us of past rural support to right-wing political 
ideas and initiatives, from the ‘redshirt’ movement in Thailand supporting Thaksin (Nishizaki 2014), 
to the 1920s and 1930s French fascist peasant movement or the ‘greenshirts’ led by Henry Dorgeres 
(Paxton 1997). Bello (2018) offers a critical a reflection of the relationship between the rise of 
fascism, the peasantry and the middle class in Chile, Italy, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines 
seen from the contemporary context. While not forgetting and dismissing the problematic ties between 
right-wing populism and agrarian populism, it is also important to identify and clarify the fundamental 
differences and the basis for such. We can seee this in a number of ways, two of which are as follows:  
 
First, contemporary right-wing populists and progressive agrarian populists essentially differ in their 
takes on the crises and how to address them, as mentioned earlier. While both populisms have 
elements of nostalgia, the right-wing current is straightforward reactionary: defending or promoting 
capitalism or at least types of capitalism, such as Trump’s MAGA (‘Make America Great Again’) 
                                                 
20 See Edelman and Borras (2016), Tramel (2016), Brent et al. (2015), and Claeys and Delgado (2017). 
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agitation. Many, though not all, progressive agrarian populists and food sovereignty movements may 
have strong tendencies towards restorative and nostalgic narratives (‘everything was fine before the 
machines rolled in to our villages,’ and ‘modern technologies entered our communities’), but these 
are, in general, within the broader and longer perspective of a emancipatory struggles towards 
alternatives, i.e. food sovereignty, via programmatic transformations (Holt-Gimenez and Shattuck 
2011). Most of these progressive movements are anti-capitalist and many of them have clear socialist 
perspective, e.g. Brazil’s MST, Andalucia’s SOC, among many others, albeit coming from diverse 
lineages, from Leninist to anarchist. 
 
Second, the strategies and forms of collective action of right-wing populists and progressive agrarian 
populists tend to be generally antagonistic to each other. While it is not inherent in right-wing 
populism to militarist or fascist (it can be significantly at home with liberal democracy), the recent 
past and current right-wing populist variants are susceptible to or inclined towards militarist and 
fascist tendencies. Contemporary progressive agrarian movements, especially those allied in La Via 
Campesina, in contrast, are fundamentally opposed to militarist and fascist methods of political rule. 
Right-wing populists have disdain for human rights (human rights principles, laws, institutions, 
activists) while progressive agrarian movements have been keen on human rights in framing their 
political struggles (Monsalve 2013). Food sovereignty itself is founded on the broad framework of 
‘human rights/rights’ (Claeys 2012), just as its core component of agroecology is framed by a section 
of the human rights community (De Schutter 2014). 
 
Further dangers and social media 
The worldwide rise of right-wing populism poses immediate and long-term economic, social and 
political dangers. Economically, many of the prominent figures in right-wing populist agitations are 
principal actors in and beneficiaries of capitalism. This means that the ‘people’ they claim to be 
representing include the 1%, that is, oligarchs, entrepreneurs, brokers, speculators, scammers, 
swindlers, their supporters inside government bureaucracies, and in some cases perhaps even a wide 
array of organized crime. Trump and his business associates are good examples. In the Philippines, 
close allies and financiers of Duterte include some of the country’s largest and most politically 
powerful landlords. Somehow, they all got lumped together in the catchall labels as ‘the underdog’, 
‘the people’. If these populist groups get entrenched and consolidated, they could maintain overall 
business as usual in terms of capitalist accumulation without any significant wealth redistribution 
through structural reforms, and yet pass this off as a people’s platform and accomplishment. 
 
Socially, racist, xenophobic, misogynistic or religious hate politics or crimes such as those in 
Myanmar, and also in the United States and Indonesia, or anti-immigrant hate politics or crime in the 
US, Europe and South Africa, or repressive politics such as attacks against the media, independent 
civil society organizations and academics as in Cambodia, Turkey, Ethiopia, Hungary, Russia and the 
Philippines, become routinized and ‘normalized’ in everyday life. Dissenting news are automatically 
branded and dismissed as ‘fake news’ or are accused as simething that is part of a global plot, funded 
by some manipulative foreign forces, and journalists trolled and intimidated by the right-wing internet 
army. 
 
Politically, during particular moments, right-wing populists have disdain for formal institutions. This 
has led scholars to conclude that populism is episodic. Mouffe (2005: 70) concluded that, ”It is no 
doubt encouraging to see that the appeal of [right-wing political parties] diminishes once they become 
part of the government, and that they seem able to strive only when in opposition.” Taggart (2000: 
106) similarly: “The episodic nature of populism as a political phenomenon owes much to its highly 
ambivalent relationship to intitutions. This makes it necessarily short-lived.” I agree that populism 
tends to be episodic, but I am not entirely convinced on the arguments by Mouffe and Taggart that the 
episodic character of populism is explained by the populists’ rejection of institutions. Yes, populists 
reject institutions, but not all insitutions and not always. There are three points to make. First, the 
disdain for formal institutions that define right-wing populists tends to be tactical and situational. It is 
usually directed to a dominant elite or a faction of it, and is a political maneuver at a given political 
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moment rather than a rejection of institutions per se. The right-wing groups that got into state power 
were relaxed with these institutions, and some of them stayed there for a relatively longer period (one 
can argue that the notion of ‘length of period ‘is contested). But as we have explained earlier, in or out 
of state power, right-wing populists have significant influence over state power anyway. Second, the 
disdain for formal institutions is usually selective, targeting those that are used by their adversaries (or 
indeed, ‘the other’) against them. Thus, they usually target liberal political institutions such as human 
rights, judicial institutions, electoral rules, and so on, while they usually hold on to and even help 
consolidate most other institutions that facilitate, defend or advance capitalist accumulation. Third, in 
my view, the reason for the episodic character of populism, or in the recurring moments and instances 
in different historical conditions, is not due to populists’ ambivalent attitude towards formal 
institutions, but rather it is because of the cyclical nature of crises of capitalism and by extension of 
the crises of political rule (see discussion further below). 
 
Meanwhile, social media enabled, facilitated and expanded right-wing populists’ tactical rejection of 
institutionalized channels. This was also most effective in penetrating the countryside in the fastest 
way possible without filters from traditional elite brokers such as churches or small town caciques and 
other elites. Smart phones, Facebook and Twitter have, under certain conditions and in various ways, 
democratized access to information, whether fake news or otherwise, and provided a mass access to 
photo, audio and video technological facilities and resources with ease and minimal cost using smart 
phones. The traditional role of elite allies of geographically and socially marginalized rural population, 
namely, rural school teachers, church leaders, educated young intellectuals, caciques, among others, 
has been transformed, and partly, has been increasingly replaced by more diverse in situ and distant 
information brokers and populist agitators. For example, a blogger and social media agitator who is 
part of the core group of a right-wing populist leader can have millions of followers on Twitter or 
Facebook, including those who live in the countryside. What is to be pointed out here is that this can 
be a double-edged sword: the same technologies enabled the volunteers for Bernie Sanders to directly, 
quickly and frequently connect with millions of people who would become supporters of the electoral 
insurgency; but the right-wing upsurge led by Trump was also largely enabled by the same 
technologies.  
 
But there is always a danger that the core group of right-wing populism may persist, expand in number 
and political influence. The way some groups fight right-wing populism by addressing populist 
leaders, core group and supporters can influence whether the right-wing core group gets consolidated 
and expanded, or undermined. There are some problematic ways of confronting right-wing populist 
groups. First, it is a mistake to consider a populist group ideologically homogeneous. Second, is to 
perceive a right-wing group as homogeneous in terms of social class, race and ethnicity. Third, it is 
essential to see the inherent contradictions within right-wing populist groups between leaders, core 
group, supporters and sympathizers. Fourth, dismissive, insulting or condescending remarks addressed 
to any of the leaders, core group, or supporters and sympathizers or all of them altogether can, under 
certain conditions, have a counterproductive effect of actually helping consolidate their perception of 
the antagonism between ‘them’ (as ‘the underdog’) and the ‘others’ (the elite). When this happens, 
there is a danger that the core group grows with supporters and sympathizers joining them, fortifying 
the previously tenuous relationship between populist leaders and their mass sympathizers. This 
dangerous scenario is even more likely in the era of social media where the back-and-forth exchanges 
are often public and where passions flare up so quickly. Fake news is generated and routinized in this 
process. For instance, insulting redshirt movement participants as stupid, ignorant peasants might help 
consolidate and expand the populist core group among Thailand’s northeast rural communities. 
Mocking Duterte supporters’ imperfect and unpolished Tagalog (the minority language of the national 
capital and the traditional elite) may only help consolidate Duterte’s base and maintain his popularity.  
 
Opportunities to fight right-wing populism and capitalism  
As discussed earlier, the rise of right-wing populism is partly due to the multiple crises caused by 
capitalism. The right-wing populist agitation is anchored in a rhetoric in which salvation is, ironically, 
latched on capitalism, the very cause of the crisis which the populist agitation purports to address. 
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Unfortunately, the contradiction in this is not always obvious. This is where agrarian movements as 
well as food sovereignty becomes a potent social force that, together with other progressive social 
forces, can make a modest but significant effort at countering the rise of right-wing populism. There 
are a number of material reasons why this is so.  
 
First, shared narratives about how corporate elites and oligarchs, or at least a section of it, in collusion 
with corrupt officials managed to break systems, whether the industrial economy or local food 
production, easily resonate across both right-wing populist groups and food sovereignty movements. 
Second, right-wing populist groups and agrarian movements may share a far more common actual 
social mass base in the countryside (and beyond) than perhaps we imagine. The general feeling of 
neglect, lack of wealth and power redistribution, joblessness and social decay in the countryside can 
easily become the same top issues among these two political groups. Economically hard-up and 
socially marginalized urban dwellers are likely to straddle the two political camps as well.  
 
Third, inherent in agrarian movements and/as food sovereignty movements are their multi-class 
character, and it may be able to cross class lines to forge broader alliances. For example, rural 
constituencies of food sovereignty have forged alliance with urban sectors: workers, urban poor 
communities, urban consumers, and so on.  There is an interesting difference or disconnect between 
the conditions of urban and rural classes and groups and the populisms that emerged from their 
narratives or movements. In general urban populists demand jobs which gives the narrative of right-
wing populism so much currency in these communities, while progressive agrarian populists’ principal 
demand is land, which also differentiates them from the conservative version of agrarian populism that 
are usually anchored in rich farmers’ demands (no land or labour demands, but mainly on productivist 
and remunerative issues). These two sets of urban and rural demands, if and when cast in broader anti-
capitalist agitation, can take down the pro-poor façade of right-wing populists and put them on a 
defensive. 
 
Fourth, despite its encompassing agenda, agrarian movements is rarely a movement like political 
parties that aspire to replace an established faction of the elite in governing societies. The agrarian 
movements’ agenda can be, and have been, co-opted by the establishment they detest, or by other 
populist groups, left-wing or right-wing. There are ample examples of this in the Latin America’s 
‘pink tide’ countries where food sovereignty has been enshrined in the Constitutions or national 
governmental policies, but interpreted in ways that are in contradiction with how social movements 
understood it to be, such as Venezuela’s food sovereignty implementation which was largely 
dependent on importing cheap prcoessed food from the global industrial food complex during the time 
of the oil dollar bonanza, as critically pointed out by Schiavoni (2017), or food sovereignty that got 
incorporated into the broader buen vivir platforms funded, ironically, through neo-extractivism (see 
also Vargara-Camus and Kay 2017, McKay et al. 2014, Giunta 2014, Henderson 2017, Clark 2017). 
The Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF) movement founded by Subhash Palekar in India has gained 
much momentum, praises and support from Modi. But its awkward or even troubling overlap with the 
right-wing Hindu nationalist current poses difficult challenge and dilemma even for its supporters 
from among the organized progressive agrarian populists. In a critical reflection, Khadse et al. (2018: 
214) admitted that, “There is sometimes an uncomfortable closeness of some elements of Palekar’s 
discourse to that of Hindutva’s cultural chauvinism,” in addition to their observation that majority of 
the members of ZBNF are from the “dominant caste/middle class”. As Scoones and colleagues 
(2018b: 1) remind us: “Mobilising alternatives to the easy capture by regressive political forces is not 
straightforward. New campaigns and narratives are required that go beyond simplistic appeals to 
‘community’, empathetic individualism and localist ‘sovereignties’.” 
 
Fifth and finally, there is one institutional connection that objectively links current agrarian and food 
sovereignty movements to right-wing agitation, even when they generally despise each other, namely, 
NGO funding.21 It warrants longer treatment. The rise of the global NGO complex and its multi-billion 
                                                 
21 The discussion on fifth issue draws on Edelman and Borras (2016), especially on the chapter on the global 
NGO complex and its implications for agrarian movements, as well as from the author’s more than three decades 
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dollar annual funding portfolio has had strategic impact on social justice movements in a way because 
the latter has been among the recipients of such generous funding since the 1980s. A significnt chunk 
of this massive funding is actually government money from donor countries that is conveniently 
retailed through the international aid infrastructure. It is along the logic of the neoliberalization of the 
development aid sector. Many NGOs bought into the framework that promised to deliver concrete 
reforms that are measurable and based on inclusive multistakeholder events. This has resulted partly in 
the advocacy in favour of specifically identifiable and countable individual or household 
‘beneficiaries’ of specific projects. Often, these projects conveniently and deliberately omit or dismiss 
utterly ‘class-oriented demands and actions’ as something unfeasible, if not altogether admit that these 
are un-fundable. Society-wide land reform was dropped in favour of targeted participatory 
community-based formal land titling, structural and thus universal social policies were dropped in 
favour of targeting approaches like cash transfer schemes, system wide state-directed credit policies 
were replaced with self-help micro-finance projects, system-wide citizen accountability struggles were 
replaced with multistakeholderism for consultation, participation and transparency, struggles for just 
systems of production and trade were replaced with initiatives for farmers to get inserted into the 
commodity value chain. Separately and together, these instances of neoliberalization of ‘development 
work’ have transformed many social movements and NGOs, by radically making them more 
moderate, resulted in the dismantling of many local and national movements and NGOs, or in the 
minimum, have demobilized them – stripping many of these groups with their crucial defining 
features: social justice agenda for systems change, irreverence, and subversiveness. As Issa Shivji 
observes (referring to broader donor complex that includes NGOs): “Revolutionary standpoints and 
class perspectives gave way to eclectic activism as radicals jumped on agendas set by donor agencies” 
(Shivji 2017: 10). 
 
Despite the problematic character of NGO fund retailing infrastructure, it has been a critical pillar for 
the rise, and the ability to maintain significant presence, of radical and progressive social justice 
movements, especially agrarian movements and food sovereignty movements. But the rise of right-
wing populism in many OECD countries rendered this complex quite vulnerable politically. One has 
to remember when the conservative Harper government almost successfully dismantled this complex 
in Canada; Trudeau restored this. Some have already partially collapsed amid right-wing pressure, 
with combined demands to get rid of such aid funds and/or to redirect them to promoting nationalist 
interest of national corporations.  
 
How to shield agrarian and food sovereignty and the progressive NGO complex from right-wing 
populist assault where and when this happens is not obvious and straightforward. The challenge is how 
to extricate the NGO funding complex from their current entanglement with government funds, 
reclaim their subversive roots, and strengthen their deep commitment to autonomy and social justice 
and in helping build mass movements. Two unintended outcomes of this problem are perhaps the 
possible re-emergence of smaller NGO donors who do not rely on big government funds as important 
activist entity (they were sidelined by big NGOs), and stronger self-reliance in resource generation by 
social movements and NGOs. 
 
What is to be done? Big and insurgent with a socialist perspective 
The ‘consensus at the center’ has dominated mainstream responses to addressing contentious issues 
confronting the people. This ‘consensus at the center’, Mouffe (2016: 64) argues, “removes from 
politics one of its constitutive elements – its partisan nature.” The ‘consensus’ inherently seeks 
reforms within the framework of ‘what is do-able’, leading to its inablity or unwillingness to go 
beyond the limits imposed by the status quo. What is perhaps needed is a strategy of ‘what is 
possible’. Here, the difference between the two is that the former works within the limits and 
possibilities of ‘what is do-able’ within a given balance of social forces, while the latter takes an 
insurgent approach by disrupting a given balance of social forces in order to pursue transformative 
                                                                                                                                                        
of carrying out political work within the NGO-social movement world. 
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deep social reforms. It pertains to what is possible in terms of disrupting the status to radical reforms 
that are otherwise impossible to even imagine.  
 
The problems confronting the rural world have been huge, persistent and entrenched. Demands for 
reprieve and reforms in the past were met with cycles of broken promises. The dominant ideology that 
spearheaded neoliberal globalization included various strands of middle-of-the-road centrist politics 
that basically promoted the kind of capitalism we have today and tried to put a ‘human face’ to it, but 
failed. Many of the various strands of labour parties and social-democratic parties worldwide are 
largely responsible for this. Reviewing how capitalism has, over time, put humanity and ecology in 
their current dire situation Patel and Moore (2017: 41) remind us that there is an urgent “need to dream 
for more radical change than contemporary politics offer.” The working class and the middle class 
worldwide were angry and were demanding radical reforms. Right-wing populists answered their call 
– big and insurgent – with a great success, at least for now. 
 
Is it politically non-feasible to ask big and act in an insurgent way in a progressive context? Becky 
Bond and Zack Exley (2017) of the Bernie Sanders ‘political revolution’ platform and campaign 
thought that it is not; that in fact it is the only way to go forward. They have shown, from the trenches, 
that it is difficult – but not impossible. Bond and Exley’s book’s title, Rules for Revolutionaries is not 
a random catchy one. It is in direct conversation with Saul Alinsky’s classic book, Rules for Radicals 
(Alinsky 1971). Bond and Exley recognized the contribution made by Alinsky, especially in his 
specific context, and the value of community organizing focusing on concrete immediate issues that 
could deliver palpable gains to community members, all done in an organizing and mobilizing method 
that is irreverent. Alinsky’s approach would find wide-ranging adherents worldwide, and not 
surprisingly, among what would become actors in the middle-of-the-road politics. Ultimately, 
Alinsky’s approach only aspires to alleviate the condition of poor and socially marginalized 
communities. But for the Bernie Sanders team, the nature and extent of problems are far beyond a 
local community and so huge that these require agents of social change to think big, demand system 
change and use appropriate creative and insurgent ways. This was subsequently framed in an open call 
for a ‘political revolution’ by the 99%, i.e., the people – the working class and the middle class – with 
a socialist perspective, as the Bernie Sanders campaign puts it – generating political, financial and 
logistical support from millions of ordinary people, especially from among the millennials. It is 
definitely a populist electoral insurgency, one that is unheard of in the annals of American history. 
Sanders did not win the Democratic Party primary, but the campaign and the movement left us with an 
enormous political treasure to mine for our own political projects whereever and whatever these are. 
The principles of: ask big, act insurgent, and boldly advance a democratic socialist perspective in a 
context of a political revolution may actually gain traction in far more places than we have 
conservatively assumed. “Audacity is crucial… and if the democratic and progressive force do not 
adopt a bold stance, we can be sure that the extreme right will do so,” Innigo Errejon (2016: 67), 
political secretary of Podemos in the Spanish state, reminds us. 
 
Before going into some propositions on what is to be done, there are at least three things that tend to 
be sporadically taken up popularly as framework for, or methods of, struggles against right-wing 
populism, but which may actually be problematic. First, engaging in and mobilizing around restorative 
narratives and campaigns, insinuating that the pre-rightwing populism period was well and good for 
‘the people’. This is quite popular worldwide, especially among those who were in power prior to the 
current populist insurgency and upsurge, such as liberal democrats and social democrats. A significant 
section of anti-Trump voices take such a stance. A section of the mainstream elite opposition and 
social democratic civil society groups takes this problematic positioning in the Philippines. There is a 
compelling need to take a two-pronged framework of social struggles where the direction of the main 
blow should simultaneously be against the old regime and against the current right-wing upsurge. The 
broad coalition of various smaller left-wing groups in the Philippines launched in 2017 a united front 
called ‘Laban ng Masa’ (‘Struggle of the Masses’; or ‘People’s Struggle’), explicitly declaring that it 
is simultaneoustly anti-Duterte’s populism/fascism and the elitist Liberal Party that was in power 
before Duterte representing the bourgeoisie and landed classes in an extended period of the country’s 
history. This stand is politically sharp, and the political initiative, while small-scale at the moment, has 
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some promise (see also Docena 2018: 22). Second, the contribution of small-scale and ‘too polite and 
neat’ campaigns and mobilizations to subverting right-wing populism, however well intentioned, may 
prove to be insignificant. Part of the ‘consensus at the center’ approach that is partly to be blamed for 
the current right-wing populist swing is the dogmatic imposition of ‘multistakeholderism’ – the 
codification of multistakeholder approaches to resolving class and identity conflicts whose starting 
point is an implicit assumption of the absence of power imbalances along class and other social 
hierarchies (see, e.g. McKeon 2018). Grand mismatches abound: for huge problems about despotism 
of local rulers and chieftains, the answer is community-based conflict resolution mechanisms; for 
problems with the extreme greed, bullying and impunity committed by transnational corporations, the 
answer is multistakeholder platforms; for rampant problems of land grabbing, the answer is 
transparent and consultative administrative processes (of land grabbing!), and so on. There are serious 
class and power imbalances in these spaces where dominant actors actively ignored or deliberately 
misunderstood politicized notions of ‘accountability’ (Ribot 1999, Gaventa 2006, Fox 2007), or 
deliberately avoided radical interpretation and use of governance instruments such as Free, Prior, 
Informed Consent (FPIC) (Franco 2014). Third, a sectoral struggle (e.g. trade union, peasant) against 
right-wing populism is a necessary but far from sufficient banner for social justice framing and for a 
spearhead social movement that can unite working classes and sectors that are struggling, or have the 
potential to struggle, against right-wing populism. The scale of operations and exposure of food 
sovereignty movements is relatively marginal compared to that of right-wing populism. In fact, food 
sovereignty – its ideas and movements – radically shrinks when viewed from the perspective of big 
politics which right-wing populist groups steer. 
 
If the problems confronting the rural world are huge, persistent and entrenched, then only structural, 
deep social reforms, i.e. systemic reforms within and/or against capitalism, can serve as double-
pronged spearheads that could deliver the main blow against right-wing populism, on the one side, 
and against the subjective forces of ‘restorative romantics’ (particularly liberal and social democrats of 
various strands), on the other side. These deep reforms should have cumulative, ratchet effect towards 
greater structural reforms or even revolutionary social change, and not the anti-subversive petty reform 
incrementalism that the ‘consensus at the center’ promoted that do not recast existing social structures 
in any significant degree. These are deep social reforms that are understood and advocated, 
unapologetically, within a longer and broader socialist perspective. 
 
To have a bigger impact, agrarian movements have to engage in broader political initiatives (electoral 
politics, political parties, multi-sectoral alliances, and so on), spheres of politics that these many of 
these agrarian movements and their broader coalitional food sovereignty movements are not yet 
significantly engaged in. More importantly, it is critical that agrarian movements and food sovereignty 
movements be consciously framed within a broadly socialist perspective. And in the context of the 
subsequent discussion below, it is useful to think less of agrarian movements as ‘farmers’ 
movements’, but of sectoral movements that comprise them, namely, peasant movements, farmers’ 
movements, fishers’ movements, indigenous peoples movements, community food movements, and so 
on, on the one hand, and the broader social justice movements that include multi-class, multisectoral 
alliances (trade unions, urban poor, middle class, and so on) and political parties, on the other hand. 
This is because in many societies where right-wing populism has to be countered, agrarian movements 
and food sovereignty movements are either absent, e.g. Russia,22 Cambodia, or relatively marginal, 
e.g. Myanmar and South Africa. This is in addition to the fact that agrarian movement banner issues 
(land reform, food sovereignty), while strategically important, are relatively narrow or discounted 
from a capitalist narrative compared to what is warranted by the general political situation. 
 
In the era of converging global crises and right-wing populist agitations, the relevance and urgency of 
radical deep social reforms, or indeed, a ‘revolution’, have been highlighted even more. Five goals of 
deep social reforms and ways to pursue them are particularly relevant in the current condition of the 
rural world today and in the context of confronting right-wing populism, namely, redistribution, 
recognition, restitution, regeneration and resistance – or rather, revolution (as will be dicsussed 
                                                 
22 See, for example, Visser et al. (2015) for a relevant discussion in the context of Russia. 
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further below). 23  These are deep reforms that are directed at the heart of social structures and 
institutions that reflect and maintain classes and class rule, and could, or should, ratchet up towards 
structural transformation that could undermine capitalism and pave the way for a socialist alternative. 
It does not shy away from class conflict and politics; in fact these are at the heart of the five R’s. These 
proposed ‘deep social reforms’ are fundamentally different from the dominant ‘third way’ or social-
democratic reforms, arguably, because the latter actually legitimize and strengthen capitalism through 
incremental reforms that are at best ameliorative, as they shy away from class antagonisms and thus 
class politics, while the transformative deep social reforms put forward here, if taken seriously really 
constitute a political revolution, and not just reforms. The five R’s put forward here require multi-class 
struggles far broader than agrarian struggles. Nevertheless, agrarian movements may be able to make 
strategic contribution to these social struggles. We now turn to an abbreviated discussion of each of 
these goals below. 
 
First, where wealth and the means of production to create wealth, especially land, in the context of the 
rural world, are monopolized by a few, veering towards the obscene 1%-versus-99% ratio, wealth and 
power redistribution becomes urgent and fundamental. In the context of agrarian societies, it includes 
redistribution of access and control of the key means of production: land, water, seas, forests – thus 
contesting the essence of capitalism. 24  Second, where social exclusion, marginalization and 
discrimination by one dominant social group over other groups constitute an oppressive social 
complex layered in xenophobia, racism, misogyny, and so on, social struggles for recognition can 
become an important struggle that can expose the fundamentally regressive nature of right-wing 
populists. In agrarian societies, this can entail recognition of indigenous peoples’ right over their 
territory, or women’s rights to their distinct access and control of the means of production: land, water, 
forests. Third, where people lost their land, territory, houses, savings, pensions and other important 
means of production and reproduction because of broad corporate resource grabs, or lost healthcare 
because of scams by financial swindlers,25 social struggles for restitution have to be a key front. In 
                                                 
23 The discussion on the 5 R’s draws from a long history of my work on land politics in collaboration with 
several colleagues and comrades, starting from redistribution and recognition that are basically a direct and 
logical extension of struggles for land and territory, and in recent years, especially informed by my work on land 
grabs and expulsions, the inseparable issue of ‘restoration’ of access, or ‘restitution’ has been brought; thus, 3 
R’s. The last few years in my research work have been devoted to researching the intersection between climate 
change politics (mitigation and adaptation) and land grabbing, and this is where the ‘regeneration’ angle has 
come about. The discussion and inclusion here of ‘resistance’ is in dialogue with Fraser’s third R, namely, 
‘representation’. For the progression of our work on this, see Franco, Borras and Monsalve (2015), Borras and 
Franco (forthcoming), and Franco and Borras (forthcoming). Nancy Frasers’ work on ‘redistribution’, 
‘recognition’, and ‘representation’ provides some inspiration to the current formulation (Fraser and Honneth 
2003). Patel and Moore (2017: 207-212) put forward a similar proposition for the way forward around five R’s: 
recognition, reparation, redistribution, reimagination, and recreation – where individually and collectively some 
of these have overlapping messages as the 5 R’s in the current paper. 
24 Redistribution of the means of production, especially land, in the context of agrarian societies is key to class 
politics and struggle: it can prevent corporate and rich peasant capture of food sovereignty, and in its core, 
agroecology. The organic food industry was easily captured by corporations and got routinized within capitalism. 
Part of the reason for that is the nature of organic farming, i.e. agnostic to class: everyone can do it. Quickly, 
technology for large-scale organic farming was developed where corporations dominate in production and 
distribution. This is where the potential of agroecology may draw a difference. The close loop nature of 
agroecology requires that those engaged in agroecology have control over the means of production and natural 
resources not in parcelized manner but in their natural ecological web: land, forest, water source, and so on. My 
sense is that agroecology is likely to flourish better where the capitalist notion of individual land property regime 
has not yet dominated or has already been reconstructed through redistributive reforms. In most settings marked 
by existing land monopoly and absence of access to natural resources, the key is the struggle for redistribution to 
allow for agroecology to flourish in a larger or even system-wide scale, is to be pursued. Even when corporations 
may not be keen on agroecology (as organic farming may be far more feasible and lucrative) allowing for the 
flourishing of enclaves of agroecology zones, enclave-type experiments in agroecology can be susceptible to rich 
peasant capture, as some tendencies in the Zero Budget Natural Farming (ZBNF) in India demonstrates. Rosset 
and Altieri (2018) offer a state of the art on the science and politics of agroecology. 
25 Harvey’s broadly cast ‘accumulation by dispossession’ comes to mind (Harvey (2003). 
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many rural areas, this means restitution of access to land, territory, water, forests, especially in light of 
the global land grabbing during the past decade.26 Fourth, ecological and climate crisis is the hallmark 
of the contemporary period in world history largely caused by capitalism, and has deep roots in the 
history of capitalism, in the capitalocene (Moore 2017). Social struggles for ecological regeneration 
and environmental justice have become an integral part of broader social justice struggles, as 
Martinez-Alier et al. (2017) argue. This connects with what Patel and Moore (2017: 43) call 
‘reparation ecology’, which they define as: “Redistributing care, land, and work so that everyone has a 
chance to contribute to the improvement of their lives and to that of the ecology around them can undo 
the violence of abstraction that capitalism makes us perform every day.” In the context of agrarian and 
food sovereignty movements, this can include struggles for agroecological farming systems (Rosset 
and Altieri 2018). Fifth, these four goals of deep social reforms can only be accomplished through 
fierce, relentless and disruptive resistance within and/or against capitalism – which really means, 
political revolution. This puts agrarian movements directly in confrontation with right-wing populist 
groups, the latter being generally believers, or champions, or defenders, or apologists of capitalism. 
 
Political actions around these five social reforms that expose the contradictory ideological positions 
between social justice movements and right-wing populism may progressively undermine the latter. 
This is because right-wing populists are unlikely to meet the social justice-oriented demands of ‘the 
people’ because ultimately their basic interests are likely to fundamentally clash with the people’s 
demands. Vanaik (2018) reminds us, for example, that basic agrarian issues (land, food, rural jobs) 
render Modi politically vulnerable. As emphasized earlier, these five fronts of struggle require broader 
political struggles beyond agrarian and food sovereignty struggles, but it will be important for these 
struggles to have a solid agrarian component. 
 
The five R’s discussed above are not to be treated like a checklist from which one can cherry-pick in 
checking boxes. The five R’s are linked in their logic because these are responding to inherently 
interconnected social processes. These can be seen in a few illustrations. First, contemporary 
capitalism has seized the opportunity to make profit out of responses to climate change via market-
based transactions such as carbon sequestration and trading, biofuels, and neoliberal nature 
conservation. In essence, it is ‘regeneration by dispossession’ – defined here as the capitalist project of 
operating within and regenerating nature by dispossessing ordinary villagers to facilitate continuous 
capital accumulation.  Many of the conservation initiatives associated with climate change politics, in 
varying degrees, are associated with this strategy. One way to confront ‘regeneration by dispossession’ 
is through ‘regeneration by restitution’, ‘regeneration by recognition’, ‘regeneration by 
redistribution’, or a combination of these, all in the context explained above. 
 
Second, ‘redistribution without transformation’ represents, in many settings today, the pre-populist 
agitation period, the elitist ‘business as usual’ era. Various forms of redistribution that were usually 
concessions that were outcomes of social struggles, such as land redistribution, were ultimately carried 
out within a broadly hostile neoliberal system, so that any initial gains were easily cancelled out. Many 
land reforms in the past (prior to and during neoliberalism) suffered the same fate: small-scale farmer 
beneficiaries lost out within a broadly neoliberal agricultural policy climate. The neoliberal era 
populist cash transfer schemes can, arguably, fit this category. Some redistributive reforms provoked 
tensions around issues related to identity politics, such as the recognition claims by indigenous peoples 
or women that were absent if not altogether undermined by conventional land reforms. All these have 
contributed to the accumulation of frustration and anger by ordinary people, many of whom have 
turned to support right-wing populist groups. Struggling against right-wing populism can be done 
partly by pursuing struggles for redistribution that has to be dovetailed with further reforms: thus, 
‘redistribution with transformation’, ‘redistribution with recognition,’ ‘redistribution with 
regeneration,’ or a combination of these. 
 
                                                 
26  For an updated overview of the state of the art in land grabbing literature, see Franco and Borras 
(forthcoming). 
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If we take a closer look at the five R’s, we can begin to understand better how their logics are 
intertwined, how under certain conditions their failure in the past fed into the right-wing populist 
‘politics of appearances’, and how they contain the potential to subvert right-wing populism. Middle-
of-the-road, social democratic type reformers shied away from big and often insurgent reforms. Yet, 
one has to not forget that most of the rights and freedoms we have today, e.g. eight hour working days, 
minimum wage laws, the formal end of apartheid in South Africa, and so on were big and insurgent in 
their own settings and time and seemed impossible until the political momentum in their favour 
overruled any conservatisim, skepticism, or pessimism. The problems confronting humanity today that 
are intertwined with the rise of right-wing populisms are huge and entrenched. The only way to erode 
them is to ask big and act insurgent; the five R’s put forward here are key institutional basis for such 
political struggles, within which agrarian movements and food sovereignty movements have logical 
entry points. 
 
Urgent task: confronting right-wing populism by reclaiming populism 
Errejon (2016: 67) argues that right-wing populism “has been able to recuperate the powerful idea 
‘community’ – that we must build a spirit of community at a time when there is more insecurity, more 
anxiety and fear, more uncertainty about tomorrow.” What is being emphasized here is that 
confronting right-wing populists should start with a good grasp of how and why they were effective in 
what they are doing. 
 
The parallelism, resemblances and interconnections between right-wing populism and the populism of 
agrarian movements and food sovereignty movements are not random accidents. The political 
economy upon which such populisms emerge partly shapes the emerging diverse politics. The 
boundaries between right-wing populism and its social base in the countryside on the one hand, and 
the populism of agrarian and food sovereignty movements are constantly porous, blurring and 
malleable. This means partly that there is a slippery slope down which the progressive populism of 
agrarian and food sovereignty movements may slide to reinforce rather than undermine right-wing 
populism. There are two urgent tasks and challenges for activists in food sovereignty movements in 
this context: to avoid such a slippery slope, and to transform the parallelisms, resemblances and 
interconnetions in the two populisms into an extraordinary political opportunity and emancipatory 
force that can contribute to strategically eroding right-wing populism. Accomplishing such twin tasks 
requires (re)claiming populisms but without its authoritarian trappings on the one hand, and being 
class conscious on the other hand.  
 
The first thing that is required here is our ability to rid ourselves of the traditional baggage that sees 
populism, in whatever form it manifests, as necessarily and always naïve or uninformed, or class 
blind, or a Trojan horse by classes antagonistic to the working class, or ideologically opposed to 
democratic socialist perspectives. In the context of left-wing politics, this baggage is in the form of the 
ghost from critiques of the Russian narodnism of the second half of the 19th century, that it will be 
class blind and engaged in conservative and romantic restorative struggles. But as Shanin (1983c: 270) 
reminded us: “Russian populists did produce a class analysis, if a different one from that of Engels, i.e. 
concluding that unlike France of 1848, or of 1871, the main forces due to face each other in Russia are 
the state and a state-bred squiredom and capitalists versus the ‘labouring class’, i.e. a plebeian front of 
peasants, workers and intelligentsia, allied with the radical soldiers.” In the context of right-wing 
populism, Errejon (2016: 68) laments that there is a mistaken assumption that populist methods of 
work “could be paving the way for [right-wing populist] ideas.” He disagrees: “it helps [right-wing 
populism] much more if we abandon all forms of collective affects [i.e. ‘passion’], and thus cede this 
space to them.” Mouffe (2016: 124) insists on “re-appropriating the term populism.” She said: “That it 
is being used in a derogatory way by parties who defend the status quo is no reason to abandon it. It’s 
necessary to reclaim it… and to give it a positive meaning with the notion of ‘left-wing populism.’”  
 
In the era of contemporary right-wing populism, class and class politics have become even more 
relevant. EP Thompson (2013: 9, original emphasis [orig. 1968]) explains that, “the class experience is 
largely determined by the productive relations into which men [sic] are born – or enter involuntarily. 
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Class-consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms: embodied in 
traditions, value-systems, ideas and institutional forms.” He elaborates further: “If the experience 
appears as determined, class-consciousness does not. We can see a logic in the responses of similar 
occupational groups undergoing similar experiences, but we cannot predicate any law.” 
“Consciousness of class,” he concludes, “arises in the same way in different times and places, but 
never in just the same way” (ibid.). What is being argued here is that despite the apparent tension and 
contradiction, ‘class politics’ and radical ‘populism’ can be put together productively, analytically and 
politically.  
 
In the context of what is being put forward here, even the conventional formulations by communist 
and socialist parties can be considered, arguably, as populist in some ways: the general communist and 
socialist parties’ notion of the basic alliance of workers and peasants, the notion of ‘revolutionary 
patriotic forces of workers, peasants and middle classes or forces,’ Mao Zedong’s notion of the ‘mass 
line’, or some of his oft-cited punchlines that are, arguably, populist, for example: “Let a hundred 
flowers blossom, and a thousand schools of thought contend!” (and for that matter, most of the Maoist 
insurgent movements). Finally, perhaps most of the peasant movements studied by Eric Wolf, with 
special reference to the agency of the middle peasantry, may, to some degree, qualify in the category 
of agrarian populism (Wolf 1969). The flipside of this is that only ‘workerist’ Leninist parties, rigid 
and sectarian, could not be accused of populism in the latter’s pejorative meaning. The use of the term 
‘working people’ seemed to be generally acceptable to most Marxists to denote the basic “worker-
peasant alliance’, but as Shivji (2017) argues, is poorly elaborated. Shivji elaborates on the concrete 
basis underlying the concept of working people, especially in the context of neoliberalism, an 
explanation that largely overlaps with Bernstein’s notion of ‘classes of labour’.27 Shivji (2017: 11, 
original emphasis) explains: 
 
Commodification and privatization of health care, education, water, sanitation and removal of 
subsidies from essential foods which all formed part of the social wage goods previously means 
that now the poor have either to pay for it or go without. All in all, the materiality which 
underlies producers—peasants and pastoralists, proletarians and semi-proletarians, street 
hawkers selling consumer goods and peddlers selling cooked food, operators and repairers in 
backyard workshops—in virtually all sectors is the minimizing of their necessary consumption 
and maximizing their labour. I therefore proposed a modified definition of primitive 
accumulation under neoliberalism—the process of surplus extraction by capital based on 
expropriation of a part of necessary consumption of the producer. This is then the material basis 
common to all sectors of what I called the working people.  
 
Shivji’s elaboration on the notion of ‘working people’ and Bernstein’s ‘classes of labour’ are 
important building conceptual basis for an idea of ‘class-based populism’, or ‘class struggles with 
populist consciousness or sensitivities’, or indeed ‘class-conscious left-wing populism’ as possible 
alternative ways of arguing that what is needed are political struggles within and/or against capitalism 
in the contemporary era. These semantic formulations are definitely all contradictory in terms, partly 
implying concrete contradictions that are in turn partly reflective of the current conditions of the 
peasantry, working class and petty bourgeoisie. These formulations are not products of idealist 
thinking. Rather, these contradictory terms and concepts directly reflect the current condition of the 
                                                 
27 Bernstein builds his concept of ‘classes of labour’ on Panitch and Leys’s conclusion about ‘the growing 
numbers...who now depend – directly and indirectly – on the sale of their labour power for their own daily 
reproduction’ (Panitch and Leys 2001:ix as cite in Bernstein 2010: 110-111). Bernstein (ibid.: 111) elaborates as 
follows:  
They have to pursue their reproducton in conditions of growing income insecurity and the ‘pauperization’ 
as well as employment insecurity and the downward pressures exerted by the neoliberal erosion of social 
provision for those in ‘standard’ wage employment, who are shrinking as a proportion of classess of 
labour in most regions of the South, and in some instances in some absolute terms as well. Pressures on 
reproduction have even more serious consequences for the growing numbers of what Mike Davis (2006: 
178) calls the ‘global informal working class,’ which is ‘about one billion strong, making it the fastest-
growing, and most unprecedented, social class of earth.’     
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‘classes of labour’ or ‘working people’ that include the peasantry, where there are no strictly well-
defined proletariat class and, indeed, peasantry in the classical sense. This in turn impacts agency and 
agrarian politics is various ways (Bernstein 2010, chapter 8). Shivji’s (2017: 12, original emphasis) 
argument is relevant in this context; he said that ‘working people’ 
 
is a ‘class’ against capital and has great potency in political discourse and mobilization… I 
believe politically, and even conceptually, the term working people has greater potency and 
validity than worker–peasant alliance. I would venture to say that even as a description of the 
agency for transformation the concept of working people sounds more sensible and convincing 
than worker–peasant alliance led by the proletariat or proletarian ideology. On a conceptual 
scale, therefore, the concept of working people is higher than worker–peasant alliance albeit 
lower than the concept of working class. Only real life struggles against the neoliberal phase of 
capitalist imperialism will help us further to theorize the concept of working people.  
 
It is in the context of the current fragmentation of ‘classes of labour’ (in Bernstein framing) and of 
Shivji’s ‘working people’ that we also need to take seriously the condition and politics of 
intersectionality. As Bernstein (2010: 115, origial emphasis) reminds us:  
 
class relations are universal but not exclusive ‘determinations’ of social practices in capitalism. 
They intersect and combine with other social differences and divisions, of which gender is the 
most widespread and which can also include oppresive and exclusionary relations of race and 
ethnicity, religion and caste. 
 
In the definition of populism that we offered in the beginning of this paper, the formulations of a 
‘working people’ (or movements of ‘classes of labour’?) are, arguably, populist in character – but 
none of which is class blind. The current condition of ‘classess of labour’ or ‘working people’ and the 
peasantry require political struggles that respond to immediate and long-term, material and political 
interests of social classes and groups. There is no doubt that the task of getting the ‘working people’ 
organized and mobilized is extremely difficult for various reasons, but there is something definite 
about it: that the conventional progressive or revolutionary ways of organizing and mobilizing have 
not been that effective anymore. On the flipside, the notion of ‘classes of labour’ and ‘working people’ 
partly explains the rise of left-wing populist groups (Podemos in the Spanish state, Syriza in Greece – 
before all the internal problems in the latter), and partly explains the rise of right-wing populist groups 
who are able to conjure a ‘community’ of such ‘classes of labour’ or ‘working people’ in ways that are 
more passionate and dramatic: the left-behind, the pushed aside, the forgotten, and so on. What this 
partly tells us is that it is on the concept of ‘classes of labour’ (Bernstein) or ‘working people’ (Shivji) 
that we can concretely anchor the notion of a ‘class conscious left-wing populism’. Two further 
concepts warrant elaboration, namely, socialism and revolution. 
 
On the one hand, and building on the assumption that the fundamental problem is capitalism, it 
becomes inconceivable to find a future within it. Thus, if it is not capitalism, then what is it? It brings 
us back to socialism. The immediate and most difficult challenge here is similar to the problem we 
face in reclaiming ‘populism’ in the context of agrarian politics: it comes with a lot of baggage. In this 
paper, I could get only as far as identify a skinny list of potential co-owners of such a socialist political 
project and a minimum rule about process. It should be a kind of socialism that a broad mass base can 
be rallied, from the conventional left to anarcho-syndicalist inspired groups including contemporary 
anti-fa groupings and de-growth activists, from Bernie Sanders’ supporters (among the millennials and 
precarious middle class) to the multitude of hard-up classes and sectors that formed the base and 
supporters of (arguably left-wing populist) political parties like Podemos in the Spanish state and 
Syriza in Greece, from radical agrarian movements to urban food activists, from radical feminists to 
climate justice activists. The conventional left notion of a ‘vanguard party’ or ‘corps of cadres’ to lead 
mass movements, in its original Leninist formulation that was later codified in a Stalinist tradition in 
which groups and individuals that do not agree on a particular political line got branded within a 
‘revolutionary-counterrevolutionary framework’ will be a non-starter, and neither is the Maoist 
principle of subordinating all forms of mass struggles to armed struggle. In this context, and for those 
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working in the context of communist and socialist party work, Rosa Luxemburg’s earlier ideas of a 
‘mass party’ and ‘mass strike’ and Antonio Gramsci’s notion of ‘organic intellectuals’ may have 
renewed relevance and traction. But those working from this tradition will have to rethink hard how to 
forge productive conversations with those who subscribe to other traditions, for example, along the 
ideas of anarchism and its anti-authoritarian stance. The greatest challenge may prove to be on how to 
sustain the initial mild interest on (or non-resistance to) socialism of the types of Bernie Sanders’ 
supporters, the broader agrarian and food sovereignty movements, and the emerging climate justice 
activist circles many of which may not have been sensitized to and significantly engaged in socialist 
politics despite their deep anti-capitalist sentiments. If Bernie Sanders managed to boldly put forward 
an openly socialist agenda to be carried out through a ‘political revolution’ in the US context in the 
21st century,28 and millions of people across the middle and working classes and race, gender and 
generational divide came on board, a broader international conversation and political project explicitly 
framed within socialism and revolution becomes feasible. 
 
Class-blind populist struggles will not be able to accomplish these tasks despite posssible momentary 
popularity, but neither do conventional rigid class-based struggles. Class-blind populist struggles will 
fail because they negate the existence of concrete class tensions and conflict among the classes and 
groups they bundle together. Conventional purist class-based struggles will fall short in the task 
because these will be unable to capture and reflect the current condition of ‘classes of labour’, as well 
as other social practices that are just as key in politics as class.  
 
On the other hand, what I mean here by ‘revolution’ is, and based on the Oxford dictionary, ‘a 
dramatic and wide-reaching change in conditions, attitudes, or operation’. I do not mean it here 
‘armed, violent revolution’.29 More pointedly, the term is used here in a similar way as it is used in the 
Bernie Sanders’ ‘political revolution’: a deep commitment against the anti-subversive petty reform 
incrementalism promoted by the social forces behind the ‘consensus at the center.’ This task poses a 
difficult challenge partly because the justifications, mechanisms and processes of the anti-subversive 
petty reform incrementalism have been routinized and normalized to the point that it invisibilizes what 
is wrong with this approach, and the many issues that do matter to people. A good example is the 
NGO funding and work discussed earlier. 
 
Combining class and populism is desirable despite all the tension and contradictions that it necessarily 
internalizes, but the political act of combining these two does not happen in random. What is most 
promising is an enriched and reinvigorated left-wing populism, that is anti-capitalist and socialist in 
orientation, and is fundamentally founded on the alliance of the poor and middle peasantry, ‘classes of 
labor’ or ‘working people’ and, arguably, precarious stratum of the petty bourgeoisie, and their 
overlapping social groupings based on multiple ‘identifiers’ (community, gender, race, ethnicity, 
generation, etc.), rather than one that is essentially an identity-based populism where class is 
altogether absent or deliberately negated, or is a mere footnote, or an after-thought, if and when it is 
referenced.  
 
Some left-wing groups, especially those with communist and socialist orientation, are already 
engaging in similar rethinking, although one should not expect that the baggage of the past dominated 
by an anti-populism impulse within these movements would fade away as quickly as the current 
concrete condition warrants it to. The reported tension between between Podemos and the 
conventional left political parties in the Spanish state is an indication. In settings where the process 
                                                 
28 ‘Socialism’ and ‘revolution’ in Sanders’ platform did not get a treatment in the same manner as these were 
treated in the conventional history of Marxist revolutions historically. But that is precisely my point: a creative 
reimagination on how to reintroduce such concepts and gain wider purchase that these deserve because efforts 
that are more of the same in the conventional political traditions are not working as effectively as we want them 
to be. 
29 Although I would like to point out and recognize the long history of people’s assertion of their inherent right 
to take up arms against unjust tyrannical and oppresive systems, as many democratic revolutions (e.g. the French 
and American revolutions) and anti-colonial revolutions (e.g. the Philippine revolution against the Spanish 
colonialism) demonstrated.  
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involves left parties and movements with relatively diminished political power and influence, there is 
a possibility of greater openness to exploring possibilities of a broad united front with more or less 
class conscious ‘left-wing populist’ character.30  
 
This reclaiming and reformulation constitute a sharp rebuke of certain problematic populisms in the 
agrarian tradition. Examples are some Indian populist peasant movements (Assadi 1994; Brass 1994). 
The problem with these types of movements is not that they are class blind, because it seems that in 
fact they are not. The problem is their consciousness of the antagonistic class interests that exist, and 
their deliberate effort to downplay the tensions and contradictions within a movement or political 
agitation and create a single discourse under the dominant class, that is, rich peasant, banner. When 
such peasant movements consciously block rural working class issues such as land reform, landless 
labourer’s work and wage issues, and so on, from getting into the agenda of populist mobilizations, 
and instead narrowly focus on and limit agenda to ‘fairer’ (i.e., always meaning ‘higher’) prices for 
their produce, defence of the private property regime, and so on, it acquires a conservative character. 
Its leadership structure tends to be just as conservative and elitist (Pattenden 2005). This is not a naïve 
type of agrarian populism; it is a consciously reactionary type of populism. In my own work among 
and understanding of contemporary agrarian and food sovereignty movements, most of them do not 
share this type of populism. In fact, the former ardently struggle to combat such tendencies among 
their ranks and within broad alliances. Thus to lump together all current agrarian and food sovereignty 
movements into a singular type of (conservative/reactionary/utopian) populism is not only unfair, not 
fully informed and tends to be naïve, at least empirically, but more importantly, can politically 
undermine a potent social force that can mobilize to help erode right-wing populism. 
 
Meanwhile, in the liberal tradition, the centrality of the individual has evolved into a populist 
discourse around the middle class, vaguely defined in general terms, and never rigorously defined in 
socioeconomic terms. Celebrated and held sacred are the ideas of entrepreneurship and opportunities 
where an individual can succeed and become a solid middle class if they are entrepreneurial enough 
and are given the opportunity. It aggregates the working class and even sections of the upper 
bourgeoisie into this amorphous category of the middle class. This is one brand of populism that is 
absolutely class blind, in a deliberate way. In his public talks, Bernie Sanders is always deliberate to 
differentiate his take from this mainstream idea by always using the phrase, “the middle class and the 
working class”. Sander’s formulation is still vague, but it suggests consciousness about class and class 
politics. That is a promising way of framing a class-conscious populism. 
 
Finally, in their attempt at reclaiming the term ‘sovereignty’ by giving it a radically democratic 
meaning, with some modest and steady success, food sovereignty movements are necessarily ensnared 
in the baggage of its very name, ‘sovereign’ or ‘sovereignty’. One interpretation of the sovereign in 
food sovereignty can have close affinity to right-wing populists’ agitational lines: ‘the people – ‘the 
sovereign’, ‘sovereignty equals nationalism’, ‘sovereignty is nativism or localism’, or what Scoones et 
al. (2018b) call’s ‘localist sovereignties’.31The term could trigger further complicated questions when 
a question such as ‘sovereignty from whom’ is put forward as Teodor Shanin does,32 or it does 
summon the central state that may have an agenda opposed to food sovereignty movements’, as James 
C. Scott cautioned us.33 Progressive agrarian movements and food sovereignty movements have far 
more progressive and radical interprepetations of what ‘sovereignty’ means which is largely a popular 
interpretation, and why the term made it to the center of its platform which was quite tactical during 
the particular conjuncture of the late 1980s and early 1990s in the midst of the struggle against 
neoliberal globalizations and WTO. Robbins (2015) brilliantly explores the ‘localization problematic’ 
                                                 
30 The lines of thought of Herbert Docena, a committed Marxist academic and political activist in the Philippines 
(Docena 2018: 22) is, arguably, along this line (even when Docena might disagree with the ‘left-wing populist’ 
label). 
31 See relevant discussion by Mamonova (2018) in the context of Ukraine. 
32 Teodor Shanin personal communication with the author, 25 February 2018. 
33 This is part of James C. Scott’s opening address at the major international conference on food sovereignty held 
at Yale University in September 2013. 
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in food sovereignty, and the analytical and political dilemmas and contradictions she has identified are 
critically important in our current discussion about ‘sovereignty’ and ‘localism’ in the context of right-
wing populism and food sovereignty. Indeed there are awkward parallelisms and resemblances 
between right-wing populism and food sovereignty, which can constitute the slippery slope that we 
were talking about earlier. But as we know, the internal political debates and critical literature on food 
sovereignty are far richer than the one line of interpretation cited above. Most activists and critical 
scholars take sovereign in its ‘popular meaning’, ‘the people’ (Patel 2009). In this context, Schiavoni 
(2015) puts forward the useful notion of ‘competing sovereignties.’ 
 
This is where the tradition from class-based movements becomes even more urgent and necessary than 
ever, namely, the internationalist perspective. The emergence of Bernstein’s ‘classes of labour’ or 
Shivji’s ‘working people’ is global, across the conventional North-South divide. This partly explains 
for the global phenomenon of right-wing populist agitation. The issues that are addressed by all 
strands of populism have their logic not confined to a national territory; they are international, and are 
inserted into the dynamics of global capitalism. The struggles within and/or against capitalism are to 
be fought within national territories and internationally. It is not an either/or question. Food 
sovereignty movements have actual and potential contributions, albeit unevenly across space and over 
time, to such struggles that are ‘(sub)national with international perspective’ and ‘international 
struggles with (sub)national roots’. Internationalism can be a counterweight to the xenophobic 
nationalism of right-wing populist agitations. As An internationalist perspective is different from a 
‘globalist’ one that celebrates and promotes neoliberal globalization. For example, Confederacion 
Paysanne France is an internationalist movement, while Macron is a neoliberal globalist. An 
internationalist perspective takes as its starting point that social class and other identity struggles are 
fought in local communities, but that solidarity struggles are necessary and necessarily cross-border in 
character because of the international interconnection of the causes, conditions and consequences of 
the multiple crises. Because the root causes are international in nature, in the context of global 
capitalism, resistance and the building of alternatives must also be internationalized. This is easier said 
than done. How to translate this into actual political work in the trenches, whether neighborhood or 
trade union organizing, rural community mobilization, or electoral competition is another matter, and 
this is proving extremely challenging to progressive forces. How can progressives extricate their 
internationalism from neoliberal globalism, the mass dislike of the latter being a primary fuel to the 
current right-wing populist upsurge? In this context, agrarian and food sovereignty movements have 
already taken a few modest but crucial steps forward, and its historical roots are deep, far beyond 
1993, the founding year of La Via Campesina. 
 
Conclusion 
I conclude these preliminary notes by going back to Bernstein’s appeal for Marxist political 
economists to take agrarian politics and agrarian populism seriously. Taking signal from the attitude 
that some of the intellectuals of the 1880s Russian People’s Will had towards Marxism, it is critical for 
those who identify with contemporary left-wing agrarian populism to take Marxist agrarian political 
economy and socialist politics seriously. This intellectual and political reciprocity does not undermine 
the fundamental standpoint of each camp. Shanin observed the process between the People’ Will’s 
intellectuals and Marx, how each treated the other seriously and how each was willing to concede 
some important elements in one’s perspective. “That does not make Marx into a populist or turn 
members of the People’s Will into crypto-marxists. They were political allies, who supported and 
influenced each other” (Shanin 1983c: 268). Perhaps the relationship between Nikolai 
Chernyshekvskii (see Chernyshekvskii 1983) on the one side, and Marx and Lenin on the other side is 
a good example from that generation. As Shanin (1983c) noted – and again following our earlier 
discussion about the politics of naming and labeling and the use of the term ‘populism’ – Lenin quite 
admired Chernyshevskii and would not want to deploy the derogatory use of the term ‘populist’ on 
him; this was resolved by Lenin by calling Chernyshevskii a ‘revolutionary democrat’ (which Shanin 
observed to be semantically unrelated to ‘populist’) (Shanin 1983b: 35). There are a few contemporary 
scholars across disciplines whose bodies of work (theoretical, empirical or methodological) reflect a 
serious attempt at dynamically navigating this terrain, in significantly varying extents and from 
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different ideological traditions, such as Harriet Friedmann, Philip McMichael, Jan Douwe van der 
Ploeg34, White (2018a, 2018n), James C. Scott and Teodor Shanin. My sense is that the most recent 
call from Bernstein will definitely help expand this terrain with possible new interest and excitement 
from younger generation of progressive intellectuals and activists. 
  
The preliminary notes sketched in this paper offer no definitive answers to many open-ended questions 
and dilemmas identified so far. Yet, there are a few tentative conclusions that can be made pending 
more careful theoretical and empirical research and respectful political conversations. There is nothing 
inherently regressive or reactionary in populism. It is not inherently class blind, and it is not 
necessarily contradictory to fundamental class struggles. 
 
In terms of academic research, deepening and systematizing our theoretical and empirical 
understanding of the awkward, and in some instances troubling, relationship between right-wing 
populism and agrarian movements is urgent and necessary. A potentially rewarding approach in this 
context is a tradition that combines theoretical and practical political work, i.e. scholar-activism.35 In 
terms of practical political work, thinking about and building a global broad united front – sort of a 
reformulated left-wing populism, that is class-conscious, anti-capitalist and socialist in orientation – 
against the latest episode of global right-wing populist 'upsurge, ‘consensus at the center’ and global 
capitalism, is an urgent task that is difficult but not impossible. It entails a challenge to reclaim 
populism without its authoritarian trappings on the one hand, and without some of the utopian, 
conservative or reactionary aspects of its romantic restorative tendencies on the other hand.  
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